Appendix S UN agencies working in Hazarajat

WFP undertakes both emergency food distributions and food for work in Hazarajat. In 1999 it distributed almost 10,000 MT wheat through emergency programmes in Dai Kundi, Sharistan, Lal, Panjao, Waras, Behsud I and II, Bamiyan, Saighan and Shibar in conjunction with partner NGOs (ACF, Oxfam, Solidarites, Madera), along with small quantities of CSB and BP5 biscuits. In addition it has supported education through food for work for salaries for teachers in Oxfam's winter schools and women's literacy programme.

FAO crops activities have targeted improving food security by using locally produced wheat seed of improved varieties.[65] Production has been in the more accessible areas of Bamiyan, Yakawlang and Panjao, though expansion to remoter areas is planned. In autumn 1997 1.4 MT of improved seed of two varieties was distributed on credit to 28 farmers nominated by 10 community groups in Yakawlang district. 1998 was a particularly bad season for rust and one of the varieties, Pamir 94, proved to be rust-resistant and higher yielding than local varieties. At harvest in 1998 a total of 15.8 MT of Pamir-94 seed was procured from local farmers in exchange for WFP food wheat. The seed was cleaned locally and distributed on credit to 322 farmers, along with the appropriate amount of fertiliser. In October 1998 FAO, funded by UNOCHA, took 19 MT of improved seed plus fertiliser to the area for spring planting but the 1999 spring planted wheat was a total failure due to drought. In September 1999, WFP took 200 MT wheat plus 150 MT fertiliser to the area to enable the procurement of 160 MT wheat seed for autumn planting. The procured wheat seed was cleaned by local methods and re-distributed to farmers in Yakawlang (118 MT), Panjao (17 MT), Waras (10 MT), Lal (5 MT), Dai Kundi (5 MT), Sharistan (5 MT) for further multiplication in 2000. The potential yield from this is 3,200 MT of which FAO estimate about half will actually be procured.

In 1997 and 1998, 78 varieties of 23 vegetable species were introduced in high elevation districts of Jalrez, Wardak, and Yakawlang, Bamiyan provinces. In 1999, 37 varieties of 17 different vegetable types were selected for further trials. In 1998 a community-based programme of vegetable seed and vegetable crop production was established in the PEACE initiative districts of Bamiyan Province. Also in 1998 a kitchen garden project for women was initiated in Bamiyan city in partnership with UNCHS, Solidarites and IbnSina. The programme was established within the premises of basic health units and hospitals and was linked to training on nutritional issues.

FAO Livestock supports veterinary activities through the support of VFUs in Bamiyan Shibar, Yakawlang, Panjao, Waras, Nawor, Jaghori, Malistan, Lal and Behsud districts, but is facing a financial crisis and currently does not have funding for more than the first six months of 2000. Contracts with implementing partners are therefore running only to 30 June 2000 and levels of support to VFUs have been drastically cut. FAO does, however, hope to be able to continue supporting the broad development of the veterinary programme, including training activities and support to emergency work.

WHO has co-ordinated all EPI activities in Bamiyan since Dec 1997.

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[65] FAO 1999

UNICEF provides supplies and vaccines for the EPI programme. Vaccination implemented by a variety of partners. It also supports education through training and materials support to Oxfam's winter schools and women's literacy classes.

UNOPS/PEACE initiative – did this happen in 1999?

UNCHS (Habitat) has been implementing projects in the Bamiyan district since 1997, within the framework of the PEACE initiative. Sixteen community forums have been established and are active in the fields of education, income generation and provision of basic social services. The community forums have developed partnerships with Solidarites in the field of agricultural extension. In parallel with its community development programme, UNCHS is undertaking emergency rehabilitation, including repair of flood protection walls, sanitation for IDP settlements, shelter and cash for work for widows. UNCHS supports the CFDO (see Appendix U).

Appendix T: NGOs and other agencies

This section was compiled from information provided by agencies in answer to some brief questions. Where it was not possible to contact agencies, or they did not reply, information was drawn from the latest ACBAR directory. There will be an opportunity to update entries before the final report is published.

ACF works in Sharistan, Dai Kundi and Panjao. It runs clinics in Panjao and Sharistan, is rehabilitating the hospital in Waras and plans to develop health work in Dai Kundi in 2000. It also aims to open community health posts in sub-districts and to work with other agencies to improve access to health services. In addition to its health work and nutritional surveillance, it is involved in research on agriculture systems and food security. ACF also undertakes emergency work and last year did cash for work and food distribution programmes.

CAWC is funded by Novib and does construction work and emergency programmes.

CCA works for human rights and sustainable development in Afghanistan and has 54 staff. Offices are in Abe Sherum, Dara-Ali and Bamiyan City. Total budget for 1999/2000 was about $US500,000. Funders were Novib, EU, NCA, CWS and various UN agencies. Its human rights activities include monitoring of human rights and related advocacy activities, training, research and translation, publications (periodicals, bi-monthly and newsletter), women's rights advocacy and legal aid. Its development activities include vocational training and income generation, construction of infrastructure and public buildings and emergency response and food security.

CFDO (Community Fora Development Organisation). The CFDO is the support network for the community forums. It has been present in Bamiyan since November 1997. It arranges co-ordination between community forums and technical support for their activities, including training. It seeks partnerships with other aid organisations and represents the community forums to the authorities.

DHSA does small-scale relief and skill training in Bamiyan, funded by ASAA.

Ertebat has five staff and an office in Sari Jangal. Its 1999/2000 budget was $US8,000, It is funded by UNOCHA, IAM and WFP. Its goal is development in Sari Jangal.

GP (UK) does veterinary work in Jajhori.

GRSP has 32 staff and offices in Jaghori, Khoja Omary and Malestan. Its donor is NCA and programmes include agriculture/irrigation, animal husbandry, income generation and emergency relief.

HAFO works in skill training in Jaghori, funded by NAC.

IAM runs health and community development programmes in Lal wa Sarigangal, including a clinic in Lal.

IbnSina is an Afghan NGO providing health services, especially to women and children. It places emphasis on cost-effective primary health care and capacity building within the Afghan community. In Hazarajat it has clinics in Bamiyan Centre, Kahmard and Behsud I and II. It also runs EPI programmes from its Bamiyan clinics and supports the PEMT to do so from its Behsud clinics. It also maintains a vaccine storage facility in Bamiyan. Funders include UNICEF, Novib, Memisa and the EU.

IPRV is a small Afghan NGO with 18 staff and offices in Naiak, Yakawlang. Its 1999/2000 budget was $US8,000, funded by UNOCHA. Its purpose is to work in remote areas in education, health and agriculture.

LEPCO works in health care, mainly TB and leprosy control, and has 60 Afghan and one expat staff. Funding is $US350,000 and comes from Misereoz, German Leprosy Relief Association, Caritas and German MFA. It has a total of ten clinics, eight of which are in Hazarajat. Five of these also provide general health care services; the other three provide TB and leprosy services only. In Behsud it runs a combined clinic with MSF, in Panjao with ACF and in Lal with IAM. Clinics in Yakawlang and Bamiyan have been closed since September 1998, but there are plans to re-open this summer.

Madera set up a new programme in Behsud I and II in 1992. Its strategy is to link rehabilitation concerns with a long-term development perspective. It works in agriculture, irrigation, construction, veterinary and emergency work. It also undertook both cash for work and food distributions last year. It has funding from the EU.

Oxfam has worked in Hazarajat since the beginning of the 1990s. It runs integrated development programmes in Panjao, Waras, Yakawlang and Lal and recently also began work in Dai Kundi. The development priorities are livelihoods, education and health, and work with community structures underpins all the programmes. In addition to its development work Oxfam also responds to emergencies and did both cash for work and food distributions last year, as well as work with IDPs. The total budget for Hazarajat was in the region of $US1m and funders include the EU, UNICEF and FAO. Oxfam also has its own budget for the area.

PSD undertakes work in education in Jaghori and Malestan, funded by Novib and UNHCR.

RBS

SCA supports schools in Yakawlang, Jaghori, Nawor, Behsud and Bamiyan and health work in Behsud, Malestan and Nawor. It has scaled down activities in the area, but is currently looking at becoming more involved and recently had a consultant do a study on options for programming.

Solidarites works in relief and also in a long-term agriculture programme. It has been working with FAO in experimenting with improved seed varieties in Bamiyan and in spring 1998 distributed about 1.4 MT of three varieties of improved seed. Only one of these, HD-2285, proved resistant to rust and it was so successful that farmers were reluctant to part with the amounts agreed and only 2.6 MT was procured against an anticipated 10 MT. In addition to its agricultural work, Solidarites does emergency work, especially in response to last year's fighting in Bamiyan. It has been involved in road reconstruction (as cash for work), shelter and emergency food distribution.

Shuhada is an Afghan NGO with a total of 750 staff. It has its main office in Quetta and its 1999/2000 budget was $US30,00, funded by IRC-CWS, UN, Novib, It works in education, supporting 47 primary schools and in health, with work in hospitals in Behsud, Jaghori, Bamiyan and Yakawlang, clinics in Lal and Sari Jangal and community health in Waras and Sharistan.

Appendix U: Semi-structured interview, guideline questions

All of this to look at situation of women as well as men and to try to pick up on trends.

1.1 Social analysis of area

1.1.1 Social groups

Ethnic/tribal groups, age, gender

- Where people come from (settled, IDPs)
- Beliefs
- Class (socio/economic)

1.1.2 Relationship between groups

- Access to power and resources
- Tensions between groups?

1.1.3 Community attitudes

capacity/vulnerability analysis

self reliance/independence; co-operation/respect etc

lack of confidence/hope; fear/distrust/hostility

1.1.4 Cultural practices

1.2 Political analysis

1.2.1 Political structures (district, regional)

1.2.2 Other authority structures (community, religious, business, women's groups)

1.2.3 Political identity and practice - issues of concern; legitimacy of structures; community's view of its representation (e.g. marginalised, well-represented?); how does community participate in deciding their way of life

1.2.4 Impact of authorities on community - positive and negative

1.3 Personal security and freedom

1.3.1 Violence by/against the community (is there conflict? between whom? when and how is it likely to occur? root causes? impacts? who are the victims of violence?)

1.3.2 Violence within the community

1.3.3 Conflict resolution - local mechanisms

1.3.4 Personal freedom - are people free to move, to form associations, to express opinions etc.

Appendix V: Hazarajat baseline survey – livelihoods questionnaire

District: Manteqa: Valley:

Villages in valley (list)

Population: Households:

A. Economic

1. Number of families with:

	irrig.	rainfed
no land		
less than 1 jerib		
1–5 jeribs		
5–10 jeribs		
10–40 jeribs		
more than 40 jeribs		

2. Normal year rainfed yield
   irrigated yield:
   1999 rainfed yield:
   spring/kareze yield:
   river yield:

3. Number of families who are tenant farmers:

4. Number of families who are sharecroppers:

5. Average harvest in valley (normal year):

6. Number of families with orchards
   for family use:
   for sale:

7. Number of families with trees:

0	
1-10	
More than 10	

8. Numbers of families with livestock: (if based on sample of villages state how many)

Sheep/goats	No of families	Cows	No of families
0		0	
1 or 2		1 or 2	
3-5		3-5	
5-10		5-10	
More than 10		more than 10	
Total number of sheep/goats		Total number of cows	

9. Does everyone in village/valley have grazing rights to hills: yes / no
if not, how many families and why?

10. Number of households with debts they cannot repay:

11. Number of families left the valley in last 2 years:

Number of families who have sent at least one member out in last 2 years:

12. Number of whole families planning to leave this year:

Number of families planing to send at least one member out this year:

13. Number of families dependent on charity:

14. Number of IDP families who have arrived in last year:

15. Sources of wealth:
- number of traders/shopkeepers:
- number of families with household member working outside Hazarajat and sending money back:
- what cash labour is available locally (type, season etc.):
- rate for this:

B. Environmental

1. Any environmental assets, please list:
2. Main environmental problems, please list:
3. Key indicators:
   - increased flooding in last 2 years: yes/no
   - increased rainfed agriculture in last two years: yes/no
   - average time for get fuelwood:
   - increase in trees planted: yes/no
   - increase in rainfed alfalfa: yes/no
   - flood protection measures undertaken: yes/no
4. Who has been involved in environmental work: NGO, community, both

C: Food security

1. Food distributions in last 12 months: yes/no
2. By whom:
3. % of families estimated unable to afford tea:
4. % of families estimated unable to afford sugar:
5. Which are the most vulnerable groups in terms of access to food?

D: Health Services

1. Nearest clinic/hospital:
2. Trained local midwife (dia) in valley: yes/no
3. Eye clinic in last three years: yes/no
4. Vaccination campaign this year: yes/no

against which disease/s	which organisation	estimated coverage

5. Vaccination campaign last year: yes/no

against which disease/s	which organisation	estimated coverage

E. Education

1. Number of primary (1-3) schools in valley: girls boys mixed
   - number of boys attending primary school:
   - number of girls attending primary school:

(if going to a school not in the valley, state place)

2. Number of secondary (4-6) schools in valley: girls boys
   - number of boys attending secondary school:
   - number of girls attending secondary school:

3. Number of winter schools supported by NGO/other agency:
   - number of boys attending:
   - number of girls attending:

4. Number of community winter schools:
   - number of boys attending:
   - number of girls attending:

5. Number of literacy classes:
   - number of men attending:
   - number of women attending:

6. Estimated % of literate adults: men women

7. Estimated number of adult people with primary education:

8. Estimated number of adult people with secondary education:

9. Estimated number of people with tertiary education:

F. Shelter, water and sanitation

1. % of houses with one living room only:

2. % of people with access to clean water:

3. % of people with access to sanitation (e.g. latrine):

> "In past Hazaras paid 'khoms' to Sayyeds (1/5 of crop, to 'clean' the harvest, or 1/5 income) but now this is no longer believed in. Sayyeds didn't have land or work but a poor Hazara would have to give to a rich Sayyed."

There is, however, a variation between districts, with Sharistan being noted as having less of a problem. It was also acknowledged that some people were trying to solve the problem, both at the level of political leadership (Sufi Gardezi, the Yakawlang leader, was quoted as saying: 'I know only Muslim, not Hazara, not Sayyed') and within the aid community. In Yakawlang, where relations between Hazara and Sayyed were said to be once good but now tense, a worker spoke of how:

> *"Oxfam works with both groups, tries to bring people together in villages though joint problem solving. But it depends on skills of worker. And by doing projects where there are poor Hazaras and poor Sayyeds and where both contribute to the project and come close, and the problem is solved because both work. They think 'so we have equal rights on this project, maybe also in other things'. And in winter schools we have both Sayyed and Hazara, teachers and children. In Band-I-Amir we worked in a village of all poor Sayyed; they were thinking Oxfam didn't work with Sayyed. This year when we did a programme they realised this is wrong, x is Hazara and y is Hazara but they went to a Sayyed village and did a project."*

Population movements — migration, returnees and IDPs

Conflict and inability of the population to feed itself means that population movements, both temporary and permanent, have long been a feature of Hazarajat. Currently, there are three main types of population movement in Hazarajat: migration out, mainly in search of work; returnees from Iran, usually at least to some extent forced; and IDPs, caused mainly by the conflict. The line between voluntary migration and forced displacement is not always clear in practice, especially when considering population movements caused by food shortages.

Migration has long been a way of coping with the poverty of the area. In '60s and '70s substantial numbers of people went to Kabul and other cities where they formed a large part of the labouring classes. And though the war and Taliban control of the country have acted as a break on the extent of recent migration, it nevertheless remains a very significant coping mechanism for families. The hardship of the last two years in particular, with the 1997/98 blockade, the 1999 drought and the effects of conflict in some parts of the area, have meant that more families have left than have come into area, particularly from the poorest districts. Oxfam in Dai Kundi recorded 76 families leaving for Iran over a 15-day period, and ACF estimated that 12.1% of the Dai Kundi population were refugees. This would appear to be linked to the chronic poverty of Dai Kundi and compares to a less than 10% out-migration rate from Sharistan. There has also been a developing trend of seasonal out-migration from Dai Kundi but it remains less important than in Sharistan, perhaps because of the remoteness of the district. In Waras also, in November 1999, there were reports of 5-10 families leaving per day because of food shortages.

In the Bamiyan area, prior to the Taliban blockade most villages were reckoned to have 5-10% of their population following a pattern of temporary migration, leaving the village after the harvest and returning six months later in time for the next planting season. From

Jaghori, Malistan and Nawor, young men have tended to migrate in greater numbers and for longer periods, maybe one to three years.[7]

Leaving the country is not easy and stories abound about its difficulties. Many can only leave by being 'sold' to a smuggler and passed on from one to another for different sections of journey. They are smuggled first into Pakistan and then Iran; but often there is not enough money and one person gets left behind, often in Quetta, whilst the rest of family go to Iran and try to earn enough to buy other person back. Sometimes people end up in jail. A lot of girls are reported 'lost' or 'taken' en route. It is said that the Baluch take them; whether or not this is true, and if so how frequently it occurs, is not clear but it certainly contributes to a feeling of peril about the journey and the desperation of many of those who undertake it. But for all its difficulties, leaving doesn't necessarily lead to a new and better life. People also come back because they are unable to find any work, either elsewhere in Afghanistan or further afield, or because of hostility from the authorities or from other groups.

Returnees, who are mainly from Iran, form some of the poorest most vulnerable members of the population. Lack of economic opportunities in Hazarajat and of health and education services, combined with poor security, means that they rarely return completely voluntarily. Most do not have land and have difficulties in establishing a livelihood. Once they have sold the few assets they were able to bring back with them, they quickly become impoverished landless labourers and when the situation deteriorates, such as during the blockade, they are among the first to be forced to leave. Though a number have better education and more skills than those who have never left Hazarajat, opportunities for paid work are few. In general those who go back to villages are better off than those in the district centres, as they usually have connections and thus access at least to fuel and some charity.

Forced expulsions from Iran in March 1999 gave rise to fears of a substantial return of refugees. This didn't happen on any scale, but the situation in Iran, once seen as a friendly place for Hazaras, remains far from good. It is as yet unclear what the recently (February 2000) signed agreement between UNHCR and the Iranian authorities will mean for Hazaras.

Finally there are the *IDPs.* The 1992-4 fighting in Kabul in some ways benefited Hazarajat, as educated people fled the city for safer places — and whilst some went to Quetta, Iran, and even further afield, a small educated group came back to Hazarajat, where they provide the core of professional staff for many agencies. Fighting in Mazar in 1997 and 1998 brought more IDPs, as did the fighting in Bamiyan in 1998. Most recently, in May 1999, the fighting and destruction in Bamiyan town and surrounding villages sent terrified families fleeing to the hills. Many came through Yakawlang and their stories precipitated a wave of IDPs from there also, although these were not as desperate as the Bamiyan IDPs as they were at least able to take things with them. At that time Solidarites recorded a total of 13,032 families, or 89% of the population, leaving Bamiyan. Of these, 5,615 went to Behsud and 1,987 to the mountains of Koh-i-Baba. Others went to Pul-i-Khumri, Kamard, Kabul and even further afield. The weather at that time was still very cold and Solidarites recorded that 155 children died of cold and 78 women and old people died of hunger and cold, plus a further 23 from the fighting. The number of single women heading households rose from 24 in January to 248 by August. At the end of 1999, 424 IDP families from Bamiyan were still known to be living in central Hazarajat. 150 of these were in Yakawlang, mostly living with relatives,

[7] ACF Oct 1998

mainly in far away villages; 53 more families were in Panjao centre; 23 in Lal centre; and most of rest in the remote areas of Targai, Mur and Tarapas. There were also IDPs from the fighting in Dara e Suf, 25 in Lal centre.

Community and household

Local community structures

In the absence of any functioning bureaucracy or means of participation in government, the question as to what role local community-based structures have is important. The key structure in rural areas is the local shura, built on older structures of meetings but now more formalised and regular. In the districts of Yakawlang, Panjao, Lal and Waras, Oxfam has been working with these groups for almost a decade and staff there reported that village meetings did happen before the agency started working with them, but only when there was a problem or in the month of Maharam. Membership, they said, was open: anyone in village could join and 100% of the men did. (The concept of 'anyone' appeared not to include women.)

> *"20 years ago they did meetings a lot, then they disappeared with the war but now they are doing meetings again, meeting not on a regular basis but when needed. But now if they have nothing to do they gather in sunshine or in the mosque. In meeting of local shura everyone can participate equally, and even the poorest can speak and do speak. Recently the poor have been encouraged to talk more than the landlord. Everyone comes to shura meeting, even 13 and 14 year old boys."*

The worker here saw his role as a facilitator, stopping some people talking too much and encouraging poor people who are sitting there quietly to talk. He is now extending the idea by getting five or six shura to join together as a community organisation. The shura meet, he says, even if Oxfam are not there, they have a life of their own independent from the agency.

Agency support was seen as important though, and it was thought that not all shura would all continue if it were not there. Sometimes also there were problems with commanders. Nevertheless it was said that shura were 'mostly separate from politics and commanders'.

The people chosen as shura representatives were usually described as 'middle people': people who were not landlords or wealthy traders, but also not poor people as they were seen as likely to leave the village. Other characteristics of representatives were that people were 'clever', which often meant some education, and mostly they were older. An informant explained it thus:

> *"At first the landlord tried to keep his force on shura but afterwards when we explained to the shura they felt, 'we are free, we can select one good person who has writing and reading'. Usually it is a middling person, not wealthy but also not very poor because he doesn't have house or land and next year he will go to another village."*

Before the arrival of the Taliban women sometimes went to shura meetings, especially in Waras, Yakawlang and Lal, less so in the more conservative Panjao. There were also local women's shura:

"Women are also joining, except those that are very religious and some young women, they have separate meeting. Since the Taliban women have not met because the woman worker did not go to villages."

Most agencies work through local community structures and these appear to be an accepted way of deciding who benefits from agency programmes. For example, Madera, in evaluating its 1999 cash for work programmes, noted that all of the beneficiaries interviewed reported that they had been chosen by the elders of the community.

Conflict resolution

Conflict resolution is seen as one of the functions of community structures. In most places there is still an attempt to solve conflict in traditional ways, but there is some doubt about the extent to which these can be successful. People remember back to the time of King Zahid Shah and recall these mechanisms as being stronger, but the social structure is now more fragmented and this limits the extent to which conflict resolution mechanisms can work.

The effectiveness of conflict resolution mechanisms was seen to be linked to the strength and cohesion of the community. In some areas where the community was strong, local conflicts are successfully resolved by village meetings; in others commanders became involved. Informants spoke of disputes which were 'not too serious' being solved by village elders sitting together and of how this works best in remote areas where the power of parties was not too strong. If disputes are more serious then the parties were said to interfere as they wished to avoid any resurgence of the power of old leadership. Some informants divided disputes into three types: land disputes, which if not too serious could be solved by village elders; disputes concerning women, which could be solved by a committee of religious and village elders; and political disputes, which were usually solved at high level and whose solution was usually superficial and short lived. Sometimes communities of interest, such as the shopkeepers in the local bazaar, would try to negotiate (this was mentioned specifically in relation to the situation in Lal over the last couple of years) and sometimes NGOs were seen as having a role. NGO local staff felt that sometimes NGOs helped in resolving conflicts through promoting more democratic ways of working. However, they also spoke of how sometimes NGOs created competition between commanders because of the issue of resource allocation.

Strengths and weaknesses of communities

When asked what they felt were the strengths and weaknesses of their communities, people responded as follows:

Strengths

Culture: In an abundance of proverbs and poetry and music, in a tradition of winter madrasas, a lot of storytellers and a very strong tradition of storytelling even though people are illiterate, the use of winter as a time to maintain culture:

"Winter is a time of story telling, of poems and mullah's teaching."

"Some traditions still strong, like story telling in winter and religious schools."

Music pre-Taliban was strong but now people were said to be afraid because of 'secret police'. Despite that, music is still played, but not as much as before.

Co-operation: It was felt that there was still co-operation between communities, that ordinary people were still trying to look after the poor even though the economic situation is very bad (though it was also said that it couldn't continue), that the social fabric of society was not broken and that, despite the divisive effects of factionalism, respect remained:

> *"And if someone has a lot of work, e.g. to build a house, people will help him; in the past they themselves were repairing the road. The strength is that people are helping each other and if someone is very poor in the village and have nothing then people will help."*

Conflict resolution: Despite its limitations, this was still seen as a strength:

> *"And when there are conflicts the elders go to the commanders and try to solve the conflicts: this is a strength. Communities still use old methods of sitting together and they accept the decision."*

> *"And ordinary people are clever and are good negotiators between Taliban and opposition and by this they avoid the fighting."*

Hard work: People's hard work, their resilience and strong survival skills and their ability to always find ways round problems were seen as big strengths; those with little land were said to be 'working very hard'.

Hospitality: This was particularly mentioned in Dai Kundi, along with the fact that it was traditionally more liberal than other areas of Hazarajat,

Open-mindedness was also seen as a strength in Yakawlang:

> *"The strength is that since they have number of returnees, attitudes have changed, attitude to education in particular is very good, more open minded than other communities in Hazarajat."*

whilst in Waras the belief in *traditional leadership* was seen as a strength.

Weaknesses

Poverty and lack of education were widely mentioned as key weaknesses.

> *"Lack of education, illiteracy; now all schools closed, you can go to a village in Lal and find no one who can write at all."*

Conflict was the other major weakness identified by almost everyone, even if it was sometimes suppressed by military powers:

> *"The most important is that all the time there is conflict. Conflict [between communities] still exists but the Taliban suppress it."*

> *"The high competition for power and wealth, for this reason [there have been] lots of community disputes during past 20 years. Many lands were given to faction leaders who were in power and in future we expect a lot of land disputes. Sometimes there are multiple titles to land."*

Conflict was explicitly linked by some to factions and factional politics:

> *"but more differences created through factional politics, even within families."*

and led to fear:

> *"fear of fighting, fear of everything."*

Other issues that were mentioned were that people were now more materialistic and that Panjao in particular was closed and this led to tensions.

> *"Historically up to '62 it was the centre of Hazarajat, then it was more open, now it is closed and prejudiced, this leads to tensions between different valleys. It is more narrow minded than 20 years ago."*

Situation of women

This section needs to be treated with caution as the informants were all male, partly because I was working without a female translator and my Dari is not good enough to interview around such sensitive subjects, partly because I was getting information through agency staff, most of whom are men. On the positive side, many of the informants were well known to me and would have felt they could speak freely.

The situation of women was seen to have improved over the last 20 years, partly because of the effect of people going outside the area, to Pakistan and Iran. In the words of one informant from Waras:

> *"20 years ago men hated women, now much less so. This is due to improved access to outside world, 20 years ago there was no access, women were thought just to be a belonging, now men have found women can help and returnees have affected others' attitudes; people saw what was going on outside."*

The work of agencies was also seen to have made a difference:

> *"Regarding women, 20 years ago, no, even in the war women were not part [of public life], but later agencies encouraged them to participate, e.g. Shuhada, UNHCR and Oxfam; and women took courage. But still men are not thinking beyond the project, not thinking that women might get involved in wider issues." (Yakawlang)*

Although there is more access to decision making for Hazarajat women than in many parts of the country, and there were even some pre-war examples of women community representatives in Hazarajat,[8] most common is a pattern of indirect influence:

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[8] Michael Semple, 1998

> *"In the past women participated indirectly, saying to her son or her husband, 'Please do a meeting and discuss this issue and it should be done in this way. And in the meeting people were saying, 'my wife says....' And in some families women direct the men, and in many families women have a big role in the economy of the family."*

Women can generally participate in interviews, even with a male translator as long as care is exercised in choosing an appropriate person, and in a number of villages women can participate in mixed meetings — though some districts are more liberal than others in this respect and even within districts there can be variations from village to village.

The arrival of the Taliban has generally put a stop to women's involvement in mixed meetings but not in other forms of activity. Restrictions on women's work and education in Hazarajat are more due to poor security and lack of resources, provision and opportunities, than restrictions from ruling authorities. The Taliban have not stopped schooling for girls in the areas which they control; agencies have been given permission to run girls' schools and women's literacy classes, and in some districts there are even government schools for girls. Communities themselves are very happy to have girls educated, to see women teachers and women nurses and will guarantee that agencies can run girls' schools or women's health programmes without problem. Yakawlang hospital, for example, has three female nurses who operated without problems.

Dai Kundi was seen as much more liberal than other areas:

> *"It is much easier to work with women here than in most of Hazarajat, people are asking for someone to work with women in health."*

Panjao was seen as closed and conservative, a general feature that didn't only relate to the situation of women.

Lal and Bamiyan were both problematic in 1998/99 because of security concerns, although IAM in Lal in 1999 managed to run women's health work.

Little work has been done on domestic violence by any agency and the pattern is not clear. Some people spoke of it being particularly a problem in poor families, linked to forced marriage and economic situation; some spoke of it increasing over the last 20 years whilst others said the reverse. Where it did happen people spoke of older women trying to mediate, with the 'you have to get along together' approach, whilst at the same time the elders would 'try to do the same with the men'.

Section 2. Livelihoods

General situation

The Hazarajat economy is fundamentally a subsistence one and the physical terrain will always act as a limit to cultivation. Landholdings are mostly very small and poverty the norm. In 1997 Behsud was showing an average of only 1.7 jeribs irrigated and 1.26 jeribs rainfed land per family, with some sub-districts where the average was less than 1 jerib/family.[9] Tea and bread constitute most people's diet for most of the time, with meat only ever eaten at religious events, or if an animal is killed because it is close to death.[10] The level of poverty is perhaps most starkly illustrated by the fact that hardly anyone could afford sugar — hardly a great luxury — and a significant proportion couldn't even afford tea. Of the districts surveyed, Waras, Lal and Dai Kundi districts consistently came out as poorest, with high levels of debt, high dependence on remittances and two-thirds of the population unable to afford even tea. Sharistan had the highest level of indebtedness of all. Yakawlang and Panjao were relatively better off.

Table 3.1: Indicators of wealth and poverty in Hazarajat:

District	No. of families	% with debts	% using charity	Average labour rate (KAf/day)	% of traders in pop.	% of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 living room	clean water	sanitation
Yakawlang	2,526	6.0	4.9	50,000	2.3	5.7	98.3	79.9	68.1	11.1
Panjao	11,580	4.8	5.7		1.6	4.5	64	49.1	30.6	7.1
Dai Kundi	689	29.8	25.3	33,333	2.9	62.2	98.4	22.8	43.3	12.6
Waras	12,242	29.8	25.3	33,000	2.9	62.6	98.4	22.8	43.3	12.6
Lal	2,890	31.1	27.4	26,944	0.5	62	98.9	55.9	48.0	9.7
Sharistan	4,843	69.1	6.9		1.1	48.0	80.0	43.0	11.0	1.0

Table 3.2: Movements out of area and dependence on remittances

District	No, of families	% families leaving area: last 2 years	this year	% families with a family member out: last 2 years	This year	% receiving remittances
Yakawlang	2,526	5.9	4.5	15.2	20.8	2.5
Panjao	11,580	11.4	5.8	2.2	4.1	9.4
Dai Kundi	689	18.4	3.0	26.6	11.5	32.2
Waras	12,242	18.4	3.0	26.6	11.5	32.2
Lal	2,890	7.2	4.9	0.7	0.6	6.2
Sharistan	4,843	12.2	10.8	48.3	34.9	23.0

9 *Reconnaissance Survey in Wardak and Bamiyan Provinces,* Madera/Solidarites, 1997

10 Food security, nutrition and health assessment, Sharistan and Dai Kundi, 1999, ACF

Demographic pressure means that what would have been a good landholding a generation ago is now split down between many families, with the result that most households can only grow part of their food requirements and have to adopt a variety of strategies to meet the gap between this and their needs. In the south-eastern part of Dai Kundi ACF found that 66 people were reliant on the production of one hectare of farmland, in contrast to the northern part of the district where only 16 people were living off the same amount of land. Whilst the agrarian conditions are more favourable in the south-east, inequalities are particularly high due to disparities in access to land. In trying to meet the food gap livestock are crucial — the sale of animals and of animal products meet ongoing food needs and animals also form a capital reserve that can be drawn down on in times of necessity. Access to grazing and fodder is of great importance. ACF, surveying Malistan, Jaghori, Bamiyan, Ajarestan and Nawor, found that, with the exception of Kuchis, livestock holdings tended to be positively correlated with landholdings, i.e. those families who have little land also have few animals.

Local labouring is a necessary strategy for the poorest, though most of it is seasonal in nature and poorly paid — recorded rates varied from 20,000 KAfs/day in Dai Kundi and 25,000/day in Lal (and in some villages in other areas), to 50,000/day in Yakawlang. Longer-term labour was even more poorly paid: in Dai Kundi wages for labouring in 1999 were normally 40 lak for 8 months plus 2 shalwar kameze and food for an adult (and sometimes as little as 30 lak), and between 10 and 20 lak for a child.[11] Many poor families, both landless and those with only little land, work as sharecroppers. Those who contribute only labour, with the landlord providing all other inputs, usually receive a fifth of the yield, sometimes a quarter; those who provided inputs themselves get a third or a half.

Hazarajat is famous for its gelims, namads and shawls, but the sale of handicrafts now makes less of a contribution than previously.[12] Local handicrafts are generally taken to Siakhak by traders to be sold in Kabul, but prices are lower than in the past and raw materials are getting hard to find as traders from Ghazni are buying yarn at prices that locals cannot match.

The extent to which remittances are vital to the economy is a matter of debate. Michael Semple in his study of Daizangi found them to be relatively unimportant[13] but the WFP VAM team's 1998 study of Hazarajat concluded that they were vital to the economy, ranking above handicrafts or livestock. Work done by Oxfam and ACF also indicated that out-migration was an important strategy, especially in terms of trying to recover from the effects of the blockade. Waras, Sharistan and Dai Kundi all recorded high percentages of families receiving remittances, and informants spoke of how family members going to Iran was crucial to their survival. ACF recorded that one out of every two families in Sharistan were planning to send someone out over the winter of 1999/2000, and, although they felt this likely to be an over-estimate, it certainly had indicative value.[14] People generally left because they had no option and if an alternative presented itself they took it:

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[11] Oxfam information collected for this study

[12] Michael Semple, 1998

[13] Michael Semple, 1998

[14] ACF 1999

"This year number of families leaving was less as there was work on ACF road." (Oxfam interview in Dai Kundi)

As well as the capital represented by livestock, households also maintain certain reserves through household durables and by access to informal credit and entitlements to support because of kinship networks or other forms of social obligation.

The implications for livelihoods of the political developments of 1998 have been identified as:[15]

- *unfavourable shift in terms of trade*
- *reduction in livestock herd size*
- *reduction in dairying and wool-based handicraft production*
- *concentration of imports on food grains*
- *increase in labour migration*
- *reduction in investment*
- *increase in indebtedness.*

In 1998 ACF reported total exports from Bamiyan down by 50%, with a 50% drop in the value of potatoes and a 60% reduction in value of poplar beam.[16] Where previously one sheep bought a 100 kg sack of wheat flour, in 1998 three sheep were needed. Whilst collecting VAM information for WFP, Oxfam found that in some remote villages one cow was being exchanged for as little as one sack of wheat. A thriving smuggling trade sprang up, but this brought no wealth to most of Hazarajat's people, though it did ensure a supply of essential commodities got through — at a price. In 1998 a sack of flour leaving Ghazni priced $20 arrived at Malistan priced $49; eighteen months ago the same sack would have cost $8.[17]

WFP reports[18] indicated increased impoverishment as people coped with the blockade by:

- *decreasing food consumption to minimum levels*
- *altering the type of food consumed, in particular purchasing more (cheap) barley where barley was available, and less wheat, rice and oil*
- *prioritising expenditure on food and cutting down or stopping expenditure on non-food items*
- *consuming wild plants*
- *selling non-productive assets to increase income available to spend on food — notably, selling jewellery, watches, carpets and household goods*
- *selling productive assets — in particular, selling livestock over and above normal herd off-take*
- *borrowing money*
- *leaving the area.*

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[15] Michael Semple, 1998

[16] *Nutrition, Health and Food Security Assessment for the Hazarajat*, ACF October 1998

[17] ACF, op cit

[18] WFP VAM

Introduction

Context — SMU

This study was done as the first of the studies to be undertaken as part of the Strategic Monitoring Unit (SMU) initiative. The suggestion of a SMU was one of a number of ideas that arose from the recognition that aid agencies were failing to work together to address some of the root problems of Afghanistan. The need for such an initiative was recognised in the Strategic Framework (SF) and Principled Common Programming (PCP) documents. The SMU was seen as the analytical capacity that would monitor, from an independent standpoint, the overall direction and impact of assistance strategies in the country and whether or not the new initiatives of the SF and PCP were in fact making any difference.

The objectives for the SMU, as set out in the consultant's report,[1] are to help the aid community gain *a better understanding of the broad impact of its programmes* in terms of:

- *improved livelihoods,*
- *access to basic services, and*
- *progress of human rights, including gender rights.*

The ToRs for SMU suggested starting with a series of stock-taking studies with '*the aim of building an analytical baseline against which to chart the evolution and effectiveness of the aid effort in Afghanistan'.* It was also hoped that they would 'stimulate and catalyse creative thinking and co-operation amongst agencies on the ground'. They would try and answer the question: 'What is happening in aid programmes in Afghanistan?'

Context — Hazarajat

The area known as Hazarajat comprises Bamiyan province and parts of adjacent provinces. The exactly boundaries are open to debate, but for the purpose of this study are taken to be those of the old Shura area. This comprises the districts of Shebar, Bamiyan, Panjao, Waras, Yakawlang (Bamiyan province); Balkhab (Jowzjan); Dar-e-Souf (Samanghan); Lal o Sari Jangal (Ghor); Dai Kundi, Sharistan (Uruzgan); Malistan, Jaghori, Nawor (Ghazni); Behsud I and Behsud II (Wardak). Although it would be possible to argue for a historically larger concept of Hazarajat, all of these districts would be generally recognised as being part of Hazarajat and so this definition fits with agencies' operational realities. The area so defined also includes all of the poorest Hazara districts.

Hazarajat is generally accepted as one of the poorest parts of Afghanistan with some of the coldest, most mountainous and agriculturally least productive land. Much of the land is barren mountains. For example, in Sharistan arable land comprises only 4.5% of the total area.[2] Although until recently the area was not directly much affected by the last 20 years of war, it has always suffered enormously from the indirect effects and as a result has become increasingly impoverished in multiple ways. A survey of the three districts of Panjao, Waras

[1] *An Independent Strategic Monitoring Unit for Afghanistan, Rationale and Terms of Reference*, Vic Tanner, May 1999.

[2] *Food security, nutrition and health assessment in Sharestan and Dai Kundi*, ACF, 1999

The ACF survey showed that the blockade resulted in an increased reliance on wild foods for all except the wealthiest, a decreased access to remittances and an increase in loans. For many small landowners and those without land there was also a reliance on external assistance. Borrowing is an important survival strategy for many people, both to finance purchase of assets or lease of land and to meet basic consumption needs. In one survey of Hazarajat[19] 16 out of 21 households reported having to borrow over the previous year in order to meet their basic consumption needs, a level which is clearly unsustainable. But in some places there wasn't even anyone to borrow from:

> *"In the time of blockade people were eating alfalfa, a lot of people killed animals to eat. There is little possibility to borrow money here because everyone is so poor, maybe 6 or 7 families are in debt. The main problem is poverty. I have seen families who don't have anything for the winter, just one or two sers. There is no land, no work and too many conflicts. One third of the families in this village have people outside., Survival depends on having people in Iran." (Oxfam interview in Dai Kundi)*

The 1997/98 crisis also brought about a new group of vulnerable people, as many who were previously middle-ranking were forced to sell livestock and fell into debt.

Whilst 1999 saw an improvement in terms of trade, with wheat prices dropping and livestock prices going up, parts of the area with rainfed wheat or spring or kareze-fed irrigation were affected badly by the lack of precipitation in 1998/99. Crop yields in some areas were so low that people were only harvesting 1 ser for every ser planted. (River-fed areas, on the other hand, generally had a good harvest.) Work by Madera in Behsud showed that Behsud II suffered badly in 1999, with production down by 40%, whilst the poorest families in Behsud I also saw a similar fall in production.[20]

Overall, the problem of the blockade was less one of reduced food intake and more one of weakening the household food economy through high levels of de-capitalisation, incurred debt, and mortgaging of land. The problem now for the poorest is that they have no way of re-establishing themselves because of the lack of cash labour in the area. Cash for work programmes have aimed to ameliorate this problem,[21] but the poorest are difficult to reach, often they are forced to shift from place to place and the obligations caused by their indebtedness sometimes mean that the money they earn goes to their creditor rather than staying with them.

Gender and livelihoods

Even before the Taliban, women had relatively little autonomy in livelihoods. There are some examples of women hoteliers but these are the exception. Even in handicraft production, where women do all the work from spinning to final weaving or felting, men are responsible for the selling.

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[19] Michael Semple, 1998

[20] *Evaluation du projet ECHO, "Cash for work programme for food security reinforcement in Hazarajat" et de la situation de securite alimentaire a Behsud I et II,* Madera, Mars 2000.

[21] An inter-agency evaluation of these programmes will be undertaken in 2000.

Agriculture is seen as a household activity in which both men and women participate, and women's labour is crucial to the functioning of poor households. There is a customary division of labour, with men responsible for ploughing and planting, women for weeding, and men and women together for harvesting and for fodder collection. Though women are seen as necessary, they are also seen as subordinate. The overwhelming importance of attaining food security for men and women alike is reflected in the finding that women and men's priorities are often the same (e.g. for irrigation development), though women do also express preferences for specific work on women's livelihoods, for example training female BVWs and para vets.[22]

Though little detailed work has been done on intra-household distribution, the information that does exist supports the thesis that in Hazarajat there is little gender-based discrimination in terms of food consumption or access to essential commodities — and in most households there is very little expenditure outside that required for essentials. Discrimination where it does exist is age-based, with adults doing without so children can get priority for scarce food. This fits with the findings of most health studies that there is no statistical significance between the nutritional status of male and female children.

There are relatively few female-headed households as women who are widowed are generally taken care of within the extended family. Where such units do exist they are generally from the poor class (such as sharecroppers) and are recognised as vulnerable by the community and taken care of.

Household types

In trying to understand the extent to which the blockade had affected various groups, ACF identified seven household types and these are useful more broadly in understanding the livelihoods systems of the area. They are:

A **Large landholders or owner-occupiers.**

Classified as those having landholdings of 6 jeribs (30 sers) or more and a family size of 13.[23] They were often found to have family members working abroad and to hire landless labourers to help them work the land. They usually had access to both manure and chemical fertiliser, at least for key crops, and had significant livestock holdings, usually including at least one ox if not a pair. They also usually had adequate decapitalisation possibilities to survive the blockade, including tools, a large house and possessions such as bicycles, sewing machines and watches. Taking into account landholdings and livestock as a saleable asset these households had a small surplus (0.43%) of production over consumption needs

B **Small landholders or owner-occupiers currently having access to chemical fertiliser.**
These had on average 2.4 jeribs of land and a family size of 12. They tended to be significantly reliant on wage labour, remittances or access to a cash crop, such as potatoes in Bamiyan, apricots or almonds in Jaghori and poplar in Malistan. They might

[22] Michael Semple, 1998

[23] Family size here refers to the number of people the head of family is responsible, which may be more than the biological family size

hire labourers to help them work the land and usually had their own tools. They often had one ox, sharing with neighbours to make up a pair, and if not could usually afford to hire. They would also have other livestock. In Jaghori the number of cattle was significantly less, due to ecological constraint and the impact of the war. They often had to take loans to obtain fertiliser. These households had a 35.7% deficit of production over consumption.

C **Small landholders or owner-occupiers without access to chemical fertiliser.**

These had an average of 1.9 jeribs supporting a family size of 9 and tended to have a smaller number of livestock. A few had an ox and most had a cow, a donkey and some sheep or goats. They also had small amounts of cash crops or access to remittances, at least in the past. At the bottom end of this group people had to engage in work as labourers, at least for part of the year. For the relatively large numbers of female, disabled or elderly falling into this group and lacking sufficient manpower for their lands, a labourer was hired, usually on a 1/5 share-cropping basis. These families were significantly affected by the blockade and had a production/consumption deficit of 62.1%

D **Yeomen: landless labourers working and living on the land of the landlord but supplying seeds, fertiliser and animal traction themselves.**

ACF defined these as sharecroppers receiving half or 2/5 of the yield. Though they live on the landlord's property, they tend to have tools and livestock to work the land. They roughly equate with the Oxfam definition of tenant.

There was not a big enough sample to calculate deficits for this and following groups

E **Serfs: landless labourers working and living on the land of the landlord where landlord supplies seeds, fertiliser and animal traction.**

These are the same as the Oxfam 'share-croppers' getting usually 1/5 of the yield. Some IDPs fall into this category. They may have a few livestock but no traction animals and are often heavily in debt.

F **Landless labourers obtaining casual work.**

The majority of these are returnees. Sometimes they have their own house, but are often dependent on the community, living in a room in someone else's house. When recently arrived they tend not to have any livestock, though they may acquire some later. They may work the land (usually for 1/4 of the crop) or guard livestock (particularly in Jaghori and Malistan), engage in work such as shoemakers or porters, or collecting grasses and bushes from the mountains. Debt levels tend to be very high. Women may also be involved in collecting grasses or bushes, or; in the few instances where they have returned with skills, in such things as teaching or traditional midwifery

G **Unemployed.**

These tend to have no livestock and be the most heavily in debt. They are often newly arrived IDPs lacking family or land, or households headed by females, the disabled or elderly. They are largely reliant on community or aid assistance.

ACF calculated an average of 6 jeribs needed to supply needs of an average family of eight. Only households of type A manage to meet this. If the landholding was 2 jeribs, then most families would require between 33 and 46 sheep — clearly out of reach for almost all households except Kuchis. Looking at the cash-only group, ACF calculated a cash requirement of $855 in Bamiyan, equivalent to 2.7 years' work at the average porter wage at that time.

Of the areas ACF surveyed — Malistan, Nawor and Bamiyan — had the greatest livelihood constraints, whilst Lower Bamiyan and Jaghori being at lower altitudes had better crop yields and better market access. Jaghori had plenty of food resources; Malistan was particularly disadvantaged.

Landownership patterns

Demographic pressure — big families and restricted opportunities for migration — has meant increasing fragmentation, resulting in more and more marginal landholdings. In times of hardship there is also a tendency for land to be transferred from small landowners to large landowners through the practice of mortgaging. This is a common means of meeting immediate consumption needs throughout Hazarajat. Land is mortgaged for a determined period, the mortgagee taking a loan against the value of the land but retaining its title. In some instances the mortgagee cultivates the land for the mortgage holder and receives 1/5 of the crop; in others, usually prior to expropriation, the land lies fallow with the mortgagee lacking the resources to cultivate and the mortgagee having no need. With the blockade an increasing number of families had to mortgage land and it is unclear to what extent they have been able to reclaim this. ACF reported almost 1/3 of landowners mortgaging their lands in the south-east (most vulnerable) part of Dai Kundi and 1/5 in the district overall.

The landholding pattern varies considerably from district to district. Malistan, Nawor and Lal all have a sprinkling of large landlords, with some in Lal having more than 100 jeribs. Alongside them in some villages are the small landowners and landless labourers. In other villages there are no small landowners, just landlord and tenants. In these districts landlords often also owned mountains and grasslands, though usually all villagers had the right to graze and collect fuel from the mountains. In other areas such as Yakawlang, Dai Kundi, Bamiyan and Jaghori, the pattern of ownership was much more even with a predominance of small landowners and pastureland was often common property rather than private. ACF data for Sharistan showed 78% of families were small landowners with less than 10 sers of land.

Although in general the war has had a negative effect on landholdings, the Kuchis' withdrawal from the area at the end of the '70s did have the benefit of making new land available to Hazaras. Now the Taliban's control of the area makes a return of Kuchis again possible. This could have a big impact on Hazarajat, as prior to 1979 the Kuchis occupied large tracts of Hazarajat, had grazing rights to large amounts of hill land and also owned substantial valley land in some districts. The advent of the war stopped their seasonal migration and returned Hazarajat to the Hazaras; people built on valley land belonging to Kuchis (Wahdat reportedly having told them that the Kuchis would never return) and started to farm the hill lands that had traditionally been kept for grazing. This situation lasted until the Taliban took control of the area, when the Kuchis started to return to some parts of Hazarajat. It is likely that the Kuchis will stop cultivation of the hills for rainfed wheat and that there will be competition over grazing. Attempts to extract payment for use of the land over the last 20 years could lead to conflict and impoverishment.

Agricultural practice

In most parts of Hazarajat the climate is too cold to allow for more than one cereal crop per year. Wheat is the dominant crop: except in the very high villages almost all farmers grow it and in many areas it is virtually mono-cropped. The extent to which other crops are grown varies, but they include barley, potatoes alfalfa, clover, fruits, rice and (in the warmer districts) maize. Crop rotation occurs in some areas, but many families do not practise this due to lack of land, with resultant increasing infertility of the soil. Non-availability of improved seeds has long been an impediment to production. The most important fodder crop is alfalfa.

ACF report Malistan, Nawor and Lower Bamiyan valley as having the best yields, due to soil quality in Malistan, use of organic manure in Nawor and more favourable climate in Bamiyan. Use of organic manure increases crop yields[24] but many farmers are forced to use all their manure for fuel. ACF, for example, noted that in Dai Kundi and Sharistan only 1/4 to 1/3 of manure went on fertilising the land and that for the poorest farmers all manure was used as household fuel. They also noted that the spreading practices were not agronomically sound, resulting in leaching and/or lack of mineralisation of the organic elements. Most seed is of local origin.

Throughout Hazarajat problems of rust and smut are common. ACF in 1998 reported 20-35% of the fields on the Miridineh-Shinideh road being seriously attacked by rust, whilst in the same year Oxfam reports repeatedly underlined the seriousness of rust infestation in the irrigated wheat crop in the districts in which it worked and estimated crop losses at around 40%. The problem is not new — back in 1988 the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan reported that 82% of farmers in Bamiyan identified crop disease as a consistent problem.[25]

Irrigation is a vital element of agriculture in most districts. Lal is an exception to this with 70% rainfed wheat, but the more usual ratio is 70% irrigated, and Sharistan has 98% irrigated. Irrigation channels were made by villagers at the time of settlement. Where possible, trees are planted along banks, but in some areas (e.g. Nawor), irrigation channels have little cover from trees. Channels are cleaned in spring and partial destruction by spring floods is a common problem. Usually a mirab regulates water and responsible for seeing repairs undertaken, landowners being responsible for repairs on sections crossing his property and all being responsible for general repairs. In Nawor and Malistan, however, organisation of repairs and cleaning were the responsibility of village elders and water flow was self-regulatory. In Dai Kundi and Sharistan, ACF found a general absence of mirabs and noted that 'only tradition and submission to powerful people govern the rights to irrigate'.[26] Water for irrigation systems can be supplied by rivers, springs, checkdams or karezes.

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[24] In Bamiyan Lower Valley irrigated spring wheat in a standard year was yielding 1:10 with organic manure, 1:17 with a combination of chemical fertiliser and animal manure, 1:8 without manure.

[25] UNIDATA, 1991

[26] ACF 1999

Studies on Behsud I and II concluded that oxen power was potentially sufficient.[27] Though it is unclear whether this holds good for other areas, lack of animal power is not something commonly mentioned as a problem.

Livestock and other assets

Across Hazarajat livestock is essential to making up the food deficit and to enabling families to purchase essentials such as clothes In many areas most families will own at least one sheep, goat or head of cattle (see Appendix L), although in the south-east of Dai Kundi less than one out of two families have an animal. In general, the most important animals are sheep and goats, although the balance between these and cattle varies according to the pastureland available. In Nawor pasture is plentiful and perhaps the most important livelihood asset in the district given the shortage of water for agricultural use.[28] In Bamiyan Lower Valley, on the other hand, there is little pasture and more emphasis on cattle[29]. Jaghori has a lack of both pasture and meadowland and Malistan has meadowland but little pasture. In the Daizangi area grazing is available to all in most places, a situation which could give rise to over-stocking problems if not managed properly, especially if improved veterinary services reduce disease — the usual, if brutal, form of control. For the moment, however, this is not an issue as even before the blockade the number of animals was in general less than before the war,[30] and the collapse of animal prices and increase in wheat prices caused by the blockade forced most farmers to sell many of their animals.

Disease was quoted as a major problem by many informants:

> *"There is a big problem with lack of vet services, if a disease comes to the village it kills all the animals; one man, who had worked in Syria, Lebanon, lost 80 animals last year; another son bought 35 animals, 25 died then got vaccine from Panjao side and vaccinated the other 10." (Interview in Ashtarlai, Dai Kundi)*

In Behsud, 88.9% of the villages surveyed by Madera ranked disease as the major constraint on livestock. However, most districts ranked nutrition as the next most important constraint and clearly these two problems are linked — reduction in disease will increase flocks and in turn increase the problem of nutrition.

[27] Madera/Solidarites, 1997

[28] In 1998 Nawor was estimated by the Governor to have 600,000 animals — ACF report.

[29] Pasture in this context is used to refer to the grazing on hills or high plateau lands (land suitable for sheep or goats but not cattle) and not to fertile valley grasslands.

[30] Madera for example reported 12.5% more animals in Behsud before the war than in 1997.

Table 3.3 Agricultural assets by district (showing percentage of families with each asset)

District	Orchards		Livestock										Grazing
	for family	for sale	Sheep/goats					cows					
			0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	Yes
Yakawlang	3	0	12	4	19	39	23	17	36	28	14	5	100
Panjao	0.4	0	7	25	36	19	10	26	40	23	10	0.9	93
Waras	2	0.1	8	13	20	36	18	61	29	5	0	0	96
Lal	0	0	21	17	29	24	9	28	28	30	13	2	61
Dai Kundi	0	0	15	15	22	35	15	23	37	35	3	0	100
Sharistan	15	20	35	41	20	5	0	49	47	3	0	0	93
Total													

As Table 3.3 indicates, flock size varies from district to district. In Yakawlang, with its abundant summer pastures accessible to all, nearly a quarter of the population had 10 or more sheep or goats and over 60% five or more; in Sharistan by contrast 76% has two or less and only 5% five or more. Orchards, however, are important in Sharistan, as well as in parts of Dai Kundi and Behsud. Apple is the most important crop in Behsud, followed by apricot; in Sharistan it is apricot. Where families cannot afford orchards, fruit trees are planted along irrigation channels and in fields; they are valued both because they reduce erosion and for the income they generate. In Bamiyan potatoes are an important cash crop, but otherwise vegetables rarely contribute much outside the household level.[31] Poplar and willow (used for construction and for firewood) are also important in some areas, especially Dai Kundi.

Food security

For any community or household the food security situation derives from the sum of all the different strategies people have for meeting their food needs. In Hazarajat these strategies are primarily agriculture, livestock, cash labour and probably remittances. In agricultural terms, Hazarajat has always been a food deficit area. Even before the war, when Afghanistan as a whole could easily feed itself, the area had to import food and by autumn 1997 food security had become critical for the poorest groups.[32] In part this was due to loss of land under cultivation (for example, a 1997 a study of Behsud I and II [33] noted a loss of 11,061 jeribs (18.6%) of irrigated and 9,545 jeribs (19%) of rainfed land compared to before the war), in part to poor seed quality and lack of inputs. But the primary cause of the food insecurity was the blockade imposed by the Taliban from May 1997 until September 1998.

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[31] For example, ACF data showed that less than 6% of families in Sharestan and Dai Kundi cultivated a vegetable garden (ACF 1999).

[32] *Food Security through Sustainable Crop Production in Afghanistan*, FAO 1999

[33] *Reconnaissance Survey in Wardak and Bamiyan Provinces*, Madera, Solidarites, 1997

Whilst the blockade was porous and some trade continued, often by donkey, it had the following major effects: [34]

- *decrease in food supply*
- *increase in food prices, and prices of other goods, sharply above the 'national' rate of inflation*
- *decrease in income (in real terms), obtained from trade-related activities, particularly from sale of livestock and sale of tree crops*
- *decrease in general wealth of the population, and consequent decrease in charitable giving.*

Whilst all of these factors were true for the entire area, there were significant regional differences in prices, incomes and food availability from one district to another. In general, the 'Koh-i-Baba' districts were worst affected, and remote areas always saw higher prices than district centres — for example, Madera reported a 43% increase in price from the main bazaar to that of Dahan-e-Reshqa (supplying Koh-e-Birun).[35]

For the most vulnerable areas, poor harvests in 1997 and 1998 served to exacerbate food insecurity caused by the blockade. The 1997 Hazarajat cereal harvest was between 15% and 30% below normal, mainly because of the short growing season. The 1998 irrigated harvest was badly affected by rust and smut, and was estimated to be 30% to 50% below normal.[36] Also some areas saw a decrease in land under cultivation, Madera reported a decrease of 12.5% for lalmi and 7.4.% for rainfed in Behsud II in 1998, giving rise to a total loss of grain of 897MT.[37] However, the situation in 1998 was less acute than thought at the time, as the 1998 rainfed harvest of wheat and barley was extremely successful.[38]This led to a mixed food security situation, with areas reliant on rainfed agriculture in 1998 doing better than had been anticipated. This had a knock on effect outside the rainfed areas, as it meant that more cereal was available in the central highlands area as a whole. The picture reversed the following year, as precipitation failure over the winter of 1998/99 led to extremely poor harvests in the rainfed and spring or kareze-irrigated areas of Hazarajat. The lack of precipitation also resulted in poor forage conditions.

The blockade ended in most areas of the Hazarajat before the onset of the 1998/99 winter season. This led to a limited resumption of cereal supply through the commercial market, a marked decrease in cereal prices and an increase in farm gate prices for commodities normally traded out of the area by the local population, especially livestock. Emergency food aid distributions in the worst affected areas also contributed to lowering prices.

Analysing VAM data for central Hazarajat collected by Oxfam and Madera, the WFP VAM unit suggested that:[39]

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[34] Paul Clarke, WFP VAM, 1999

[35] Hazarajat Behsud I and II: follow up of the situation, June 1998. Madera July 1998

[36] WFP VAM 1999

[37] Madera July 1998

[38] *Food Security Case Study — Shirdosh/Sareqol Yakaolang*, June 1999; *RCO Central highlands & WFP VAM monitoring papers*, Oxfam, May 1999.

[39] *Recommendations for assistance to Hazarajat*, WFP VAM (Afghanistan), 22nd July, 1999

- *The year 1998/99 was better for most of the population of the Koh-i-Baba area than the year 1997/98, as a result of falling cereal prices, increased livestock prices and larger amounts of aid from the international community.*
- *For poor households in the Koh-i-Baba area, loss of assets slowed down over this period. In a few cases, limited amounts of debt repayment and restocking may have been possible towards the beginning of 1999.*
- *However, the promise of slow recovery in the year 1999/2000 is now threatened by poor harvests.*
- *A 50% crop failure in the area would cause food deficits of 15-30% and above for around half of the population.*
- *In addition, it seems likely that areas such as Lal, Bamiyan and Yakawlang, which are more highly crop-dependant, may become food insecure.*

In looking at the pattern for 1999, WFP concluded that, even after relief distributions and sale of all livestock, the poorest households experienced a food deficit equivalent to 5-15% of total food needs. Other landless households were able to achieve 100% of food needs, but at the cost of selling off all remaining livestock and most remaining non-productive assets and taking credit; some of this group should have been able to begin to rebuild given a good agricultural year in 1999. Small landholders, they believed, should have been able to achieve 100% of food needs and in some areas would have the possibility of slow recovery.

The 1999 drought, however, put paid to many families' hopes of recovery. Information gathered by agencies indicates that drought resulted in significantly reduced yields, but that the pattern was patchy. Rainfed land, or land irrigated by spring-fed or kareze-fed systems, suffered substantial reductions in crop, farmers in some cases getting as little as 1 ser harvest for a ser planted and on average only a two to one or three to one return. Land irrigated by river-fed systems, however, generally produced good yields, much better than in 1998 because rust was rarely a problem. Madera found the lack of water to be more of a problem in Behsud II than I, Behsud II showing a 44% reduction in yield.[40] The drop in production, however, was even greater as Behsud II also saw a marked reduction in the area sown. Behsud I by contrast saw a slight fall in yield but an increase in land sown and no overall reduction in production. Madera noted that although the production deficit did not automatically translate into food-aid needs — because people might meet their needs in other ways, such as the ECHO-funded cash for work projects, paid labour or emigration — nevertheless the level of vulnerability was high. This was due to indebtedness (100% of the families working on the Madera cash for work road project were indebted) and loss of assets during the time of the blockade. ACF information from Sharistan showed even greater reductions in yield, with a 50% decrease in irrigated yields (from 7.4 to 3.7/ser) and average wheat availability in the district down by 71%. The southern zone was worse hit than the rest of the district. Moreover, water levels were generally so low that it was not possible to plant the traditional second crop following the wheat harvest. Fodder crops were also affected, as were grasses on the mountainsides.

In terms of ability to restock, Behsud I and II would appear to have experienced reasonable levels of recovery of assets, with the numbers of families owning no sheep or goats declining by more than 50%. Wheat prices were down about 20% by the end of 1999 (I and II) and the

[40] *Preliminary evaluation of the food security in Behsud I and II*, Madera, November 1999

price of sheep up by about a quarter in I and a third in II.[41] Indebtedness was around 10%. In Waras, Lal and Panjao the recovery was less good, with sheep prices increasing from 600,000 to 700,000 Afs in Waras and Lal and from 700,000 to 800,000 in Panjao. Wheat prices decreased from 80,000 to 70,000 Afs in Panjao, but actually increased in price in Lal (48,000 to 62,500) and Waras (90,000 to 110,000). Data on households owning no sheep or goats showed that Lal experienced a recovery in assets, presumably because the good rainfed harvest of 1998 enabled some people to restock. Waras, on the other hand, showed an increasing loss of assets, and in Panjao the picture varied from village to village but overall was not much changed from two years previously. Debt levels from the VAM data showed an average of 23% for Waras, 30% for Lal and 24% for Panjao. The Lal data is consistent with the debt data collected by Oxfam in November 1999 — Waras shows a slight increase in debt between the two sets of figures, but it is unclear whether this represents a trend or is simply the effect of different sampling frames. The Panjao data is startlingly different and needs checking.

Dai Kundi, though poor and with low livestock levels, seems to have seen less decapitalisation as a result of the blockade — rather the poverty is long term. It is also less vulnerable to drought than Sharistan, due to better river systems. Significant variations were found within district, however, with the south-east zone of Dai Kundi and the northern zone of Sharistan being much more vulnerable to food insecurity than other areas.[42] A still more detailed analysis of the situation reveals that though southern Sharistan is the least structurally food-insecure, the area has the highest levels of social inequality with a high proportion of landless. So within this structurally better-off area, the poorest families are very vulnerable to food insecurity.

Joint NGO/WFP emergency food distributions combined with ECHO-funded cash for work appear to have prevented the food security situation deteriorating to an extent where malnutrition and mortality increased significantly, but WFP believe that they did not prevent further impoverishment, loss of assets and increased levels of indebtedness.[43] However, ACF research indicates that in Sharistan and Dai Kundi further impoverishment was in the main avoided, although as wheat arrived late in the year (distributions started in November) the most vulnerable families faced a hunger gap and in the course of this many families left the area.[44]

Agencies are concerned about the effect of repeated food distributions on the coping mechanisms of communities, and in some areas on security. It is hoped that food needs in 2000 can be met without recourse to free distributions.

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[41] VAM data collected by Madera

[42] ACF 1999. Vulnerability in the south-east of Dai Kundi was largely due to population pressure; in the north of Sharistan it was about higher elevation and thus shorter agricultural season, low arable land availability and vulnerability to water shortages. Consequent to this, the north has high rates of out-migration and of dependence on charity.

[43] *Recommendations for assistance to Dai Kundi*, WFP VAM (Afghanistan), September 1999

[44] ACF 1999

and Yakawlang showed that only 17% of the population could meet their own needs and have a small surplus to assist neighbours.[3] The poorest and most vulnerable people are the landless, estimated at 22% of the population, followed closely by those with only a little land. Their vulnerability has increased significantly over recent years with the dramatic fall in livestock prices brought about by the 1997 blockade. Though the blockade was lifted when the Taliban took the area in September 1998, its effect still be seen. Poor families in particular lost all of their assets and many fell into debt or were forced to leave the area. Remittances dropped because of the restrictions on movement in and out of the area, livestock prices collapsed and other exports also suffered.

The remoteness of the area has meant that there has always been a relatively small number of agencies working there, although three large international NGOs have had a long history of involvement with the area, as have some of the smaller international NGOs and some Afghan NGOs. For an isolated area with a population that feels marginalised and often forgotten, the psychological significance of long-term international involvement is probably of greater importance than the economic significance. Certainly this was the impression gained by agencies returning to the area after the Taliban take-over in September 1998. The levels of involvement of the various UN agencies have in general been both more patchy and more spasmodic, though FAO Livestock has had a longstanding commitment to supporting vet work across the area — though the levels of that support have varied considerably due to funding problems.

The distribution of aid effort within Hazarajat has also been uneven and has related more to the level of accessibility than to need. Most notable is Dai Kundi, which has the highest levels of poverty in Hazarajat but where until this year (when Oxfam and ACF both started small programmes) no aid agencies were working. Yakawlang, one of the least poor, was the most worked in — especially up until the UN's exit in summer 1998.

Methodology

The study takes as its starting point the premise that Afghans are, like all human beings, entitled to certain basic rights — economic, social, political and civil — and that the success or otherwise of the aid effort can be measured by the extent to which it helps Afghans to realise these rights. It aims to pull together baseline information in relation to the current situation regarding these rights, as a starting point from which agencies can measure future progress. It suggests indicators that can be measured, or at least assessed, but also tries to give enough of the history and context to make these indicators meaningful. Various indicators have been used to try and get a measure of levels of poverty: landholdings; livestock holdings; debt, dependence on charity and on remittances; ability to afford various commodities; and, as these represent a source of wealth, the percentage of traders in a community. Access to services has also been mapped and there has been an attempt to capture the civil and political rights situation, including issues of governance and of violence and security, all of which are harder to develop indicators for as they do not succumb easily to quantitative measurement and qualitative measures are open to manipulation.

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[3] *Strategies for support of sustainable rural livelihoods for the central highlands of Afghanistan*, Michael Semple, Pattan Development Organisation, Islamabad, 1998

Environment

Environmental degradation is one of the key problems in Hazarajat, leading to land loss and consequent reduction in food supply. Shortage of cultivable land has led to a vicious cycle of destruction whereby farmers grow wheat on the steep hillsides, resulting in erosion of topsoil and spring flooding, which in turn results in further destruction of the fertile valley land and further desperate farming of the fragile hillsides.[45] As hillsides were not previously used for agriculture, but only for livestock, there is no tradition of terracing to protect the slopes. The need for fuel, particularly for the long winter, further contributes to this round of destruction. Fuel is usually obtained from four sources:

- *gorse bushes and dried rhubarb leaves from the mountains*
- *livestock manure*
- *trees*
- *dried turf at higher altitudes, particularly Upper Bamiyan and Nawor*

Fuel collection is done mainly in the mountains, normally three times a year. Families need to spend an average of between 21 days (Sharistan) and 64 days (Yakawlang) in order to meet their fuel requirements; a day can be anything from 3 hours (Nawor) to 12 hours (Sharistan).[46] Bushes are stored around or on the roof of the house for use, mainly in the winter. Turf is cut at high altitudes and left on the roof to dry. Animal manure is collected, formed into cakes and dried. The extensive use of animal manure as fuel means there is little left to use as manure, thus reducing crop yields and contributing to further farming of hillsides.

De-forestation is a relatively recent phenomenon. Elderly people speak of the hillsides being covered with a variety of species of trees, most of which have now disappeared.[47] In village after village it was reported that 20 years ago the mountain bush was very good, whilst now it is said to be a major problem, often leading to conflict. In Malistan and Jaghori ACF reported that scarcity of bushes for fuel was such that night watchmen often kept guard over the mountains to limit over-use and/or external encroachment. The destruction of forest and bushes on the mountains has led to flooding, erosion of land and soil leaching. Flooding causes severe damage to irrigation systems and fields and deposits of flood-borne mud and stones often make land uncultivable, especially where manpower is not sufficient for clearance.

[45] Madera, for example, found a 114% increase in rainfed cultivation compared to before the war, Madera, Mars 2000.

[46] ACF figures gathered for this research

[47] ACF 1999

Table 3.4: Hazarajat environment, by district

District	No. of families	% of valleys with increased:			% of valleys with:		Ave. days to collect fuel
		flooding in last 2 years	trees planted	rainfed alfalfa	Flood protec-tion	NGO work-ing	
Yakawlang	2,526	62.5	50	0	25	75	64
Panjao	11,580	100	100	21	21	100	45
Lal	2,890	100	89	83	39	94	46
Dai Kundi	689	100	64	0	0	0	39
Sharistan[48]	4,843	43	60	0	0	0	21

As shown in the table above, all districts apart from Yakawlang and Sharistan reported an increase in flooding in the past two years in all of the valleys. Local people are all too well aware of the seriousness of the problem and have taken a variety of measures to control it. Most districts report a significant increase in the number of trees planted, usually along the banks of rivers and irrigation channels; much of this work has gone on without agency intervention. In Yakawlang people have the concept of 'aigal' — an area where people are not allowed to go to cut bush. The local shura will take 'aigal', that is designate areas not to be cut.

However, whilst many villagers had done something about tree planting, it was rare for something to be done about re-vegetating the mountainsides unless an NGO was active, or to undertake major flood prevention works — presumably because these were much bigger tasks requiring significant time and/or resources. Increased growing of rainfed alfalfa was another environmental improvement that seemed positively correlated with agency involvement.

[48] because of averaging in underlying table figures don't add up to 100

Section 3. Access to services

Health

State provision of health services in rural Afghanistan has always been poor and in one way or another the war destroyed most of what there once was. All the facilities that exist in Hazarajat are now provided by the assistance community, but in general the area still has little in the way of health care services and access is especially difficult for mothers of young children. Those who are not lucky enough to live near a clinic usually go untreated or, if they can afford it, buy something from the bazaar. Most bazaars have at least one pharmacy, but the quality of medicines is very variable. Low levels of education and lack of understanding of the way common diseases such as diarrhoea are transmitted also add to the health problems. Even where women did display knowledge, for example of basic hygiene, the evidence was that it was not always put into practice. There is often little linkage between technical interventions such as latrine building or spring protection and health education.

There are no clinics in Dai Kundi or in Nawor, one each in Sharistan, Mālistan and Panjao, two in Waras (Takht and Waras centre) and three in Lal (all in the centre). There is one hospital and eight clinics in Jaghori, one hospital and three clinics in Bamiyan and one hospital in Yakawlang.

A number of agencies have undertaken TBA (dia) training but there is a lack of co-ordination of these and other training initiatives and a lack of follow-up.[49] In the four districts surveyed by Oxfam Panjao was the best provided for, with women having access to trained dias in 43% of the valleys; in Lal it was 39% of the valleys. The rates however fell to 12.5% Yakawlang, 4% Waras and zero in Dai Kundi. Overall, for most women delivery occurs at home, usually with the help of a woman from amongst relatives or neighbours.

In Lal, 67% of the valleys had had an eye clinic in the last two years, but none of the other districts surveyed had had this facility — when an eye clinic is running people come from many miles around to make use of its services.

There is currently a lack of data giving an overall picture of the health situation in Hazarajat.[50] This is mainly due to the lack of health services and the resultant fact that most mortality and morbidity go unreported. Lack of agency co-ordination has added to the problem — neither WHO nor UNICEF take a lead on health in the area and the NGOs all have their independent reporting systems, which are not co-ordinated and do not systematically share information. However, a health sector group for Hazarajat has recently been formed, with plans for improving co-ordination of health initiatives and for systematically sharing information between agencies.

[49] Annie Lloyd, health review, Oxfam, 1999

[50] WHO data for 1999 for the country as a whole report infant mortality at 167 per thousand, under 5s mortality at 250 per thousand and maternal mortality at 170 per 10,000.

Health, of course, is about more than just health services or their absence and a report written following a PRA ((Participatory Rural Appraisal) of women's health in Yakawlang and Panjao[51] lists the main needs as:

- *nutrition interventions*
- *increased food production in women's domains, such as sustainable vegetable production and increased poultry production*
- *reproductive health care, including pregnancy services and family planning*
- *health education*
- *support for water supply and sanitation infrastructure*
- *women's education and empowerment.*

Though there are agency interventions in all of these areas, they only reach a small number of women.

Health problems in Hazarajat are generally chronic rather than acute. The most detailed work on the health situation in the area has been done by ACF, who undertook detailed health assessments in Bamiyan, Malistan, Nawor, Jaghori and Ajarestan districts in 1998,[52] and in Dai Kundi and Sharistan in 1999.[53] The reports concluded that although the overall results showed no real reason for concern, there are some areas, such as Malistan, where a combination of failed crops and Taliban restrictions mean that coping mechanisms are not meeting needs.

In terms of mortality, the 1998 figures showed an overall mortality rate of 0.64 over 10,000 children per day, which is considered acceptable. However, Nawor had a rate of 1.96 — more than alert but less than emergency level — and Bamiyan 1998 showed a mortality rate of 5 over 10,000 children per day, over the threshold defining an emergency situation (4/10,000/day). Acute respiratory infection was the main cause of death; children already weakened by poor nutritional status and poor housing conditions are not able to withstand infections and this is compounded by limited access to health facilities and thus to medical care.

The 1998 ACF report found that acute malnutrition was not as big a problem as feared in Hazarajat, and acute malnutrition rates — global Z score 10.2%; severe 1.4% — were not seen as alarming in the circumstances. Moderate malnutrition rates were 9.0% for boys and 6.9% for girls for 6-29 month children, and 6.2% for boys and 3.95 for girls for 30-59 month olds. There was no explanation known for the differences between boys and girls. ACF surveillance of under 5s in Bamiyan city found no significant difference between males and females but there was a difference between age groups, with the 6-29 months group being significantly more malnourished than 30-59 months age group. The most vulnerable districts (excluding Bamiyan town) were Jaghori and Malistan, the former somewhat surprising as it had more food and health facilities available. However, whilst malnutrition was not a major problem, in all regions surveyed except Jaghori 60% or more of children

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[51] SC-US/UNOPS 1998

[52] *Nutrition, health and food security assessment for the Hazarajat, Afghanistan*, Oct 1998

[53] *Food security, nutrition and health assessment, Sharestan and Dai Kundi districts*, 1999. ACF

were stunted. The high proportion of children suffering from growth retardation may also lead to an immunodeficiency and thus to risk of infection. This stunting may be an indication of bad diet over a long period of time, though ACF urged caution in interpreting the results as the Hazara people are genetically shorter than the reference population. The 1999 report for Dai Kundi and Sharistan gave global acute malnutrition rates of children aged 6-59 months of Z score 3.7% and severe acute malnutrition rates of Z score 0.2%. Children aged 6-29 months had rates of 7.0% and 0.4%. As with the earlier work, acute rates for boys were found to be higher than for girls in Dai Kundi, though not in Sharistan.

With history of limited food resources, micro nutrient deficiencies are likely. The accumulative effects on women, consequently being passed on to their babies, may be one of the reasons for high maternal and infant mortality. Anaemia (iron deficiency) and goitre (iodine deficiency) are common, lathyrism, caused by eating the plant *Lathyrus sativus*, was reported as becoming a problem in Nawor and Malistan. The plant, formerly used as animal feed, was becoming an increasing addition to the diet of the community.[54]

Health problems are made worse because of poor living conditions. In many areas less than half the population had access to safe water, and less than 10% access to latrines — and even where people had them they often did not use them.

Vaccination

With the exception of polio, vaccination rates in Hazarajat are low even in Bamiyan city and vaccination coverage in many rural areas is almost non-existent. Mass Immunisation Days for eradication of polio were organised in 1994 and 1995. In 1997 vaccination campaigns were virtually stopped because of political situation but NIDs[55] for polio were organised in 13 districts of Hazarajat in 1998 and again in 1999.

In Bamiyan WHO has co-ordinated all EPI activities since December 1997. UNICEF provides supplies and vaccines and vaccination is implemented by a variety of partners, including IbnSina (responsible for the cold chain and the main vaccine store for the province), MoPH, ICRC and the Iranian MoPH. The EPI operates through five fixed centre and four outreach teams and the target population is under 1s, though it is likely that under 2s presenting will also be vaccinated.

[54] ACF, 1998

[55] National Immunisation Days

A recent ACF report shows the following vaccination rates for children under 2.[56]

Vaccine	Recorded on card	Information from card plus history
BCG	64.2%	67.5%
DPT1	38.3%	63.0%
DPT2	30.4%	40.8%
DPT3	20.4%	27.2%
OPV1	36.3%	79.8%
OPV2	27.5%	38.1%
OPV3	19.2%	25.4%
Measles	25.8%	34.3%
All doses valid	13.8%	17.6%

The big difference for OPV1 between card (36.3%) and card plus history (79.8%) might be due to the NIDs whose purpose was polio eradication rather than individual immunisation and therefore not all doses were recorded on vaccination cards.

The Bamiyan rates, although not bad when compared to other cities in Afghanistan,[57] are far from adequate, but they are much better than elsewhere in Hazarajat.

Vaccination status for the six districts covered by the ACF survey was assessed by considering measles only (on the assumption that, as this is normally the last in a series of vaccinations, the child will have benefited from the rest). The survey shows a maximum coverage of 21%, in Nawor, and possibly as little as 2% in Malistan.

Region	Card %	Mother's word %	Total %
Ajarestan	0	16	16
Bamiyan	24	17	41
Jaghori	4	16	20
Malistan	2	2	4
Nawor	14	7	21
Totals	9	11	20

BCG or DPT1 coverage was 71.3%, indicating that a high proportion of children had at least one contact with the EPI. However, 56.4% of children receiving the first dose of DPT never received the third dose.

IbnSina rates for Bamiyan for the first three quarters of 1999 showed DPT1 rates of 30% and DPT3 rates of 16% (under 1s and 1-2s combined). IbnSina, however, reported that it had encountered a number of problems in undertaking its 1999 EPI work in Bamiyan having had no EPI supplies for 8 months. Also back payments due to vaccinators had been greatly

[56] This and following information from ACF 1998 report.

[57] They are less than Kabul (37.8% - under 2s card plus history) or Jalalabad (24.9%) but better than Kandahar, Ghazni or Heart.

delayed due to the conflict and to problems within WHO/UNICEF, resulting in a negative impact on the morale of the vaccinators.

Vaccination rates outside the towns are much lower. ACF records only 2.5% of children in Dai Kundi and Sharistan vaccinated against measles as proved by cards, and only 8.9% on parents' recall. Oxfam data for Lal, Yakawlang, Waras and Panjao is less thorough (being based on staff and community estimates for valleys rather than individual records) but indicates that whilst polio coverage is generally good, both in terms of numbers of valleys reached and coverage within those valleys (Lal is an exception with patchy coverage, this may have been due to the poor security situation), coverage for other vaccines is very poor.

Education

General situation

Education facilities in Afghanistan have always been limited, especially in the rural areas. Literacy rates were and still are exceptionally low, especially for women. Hazarajat is no exception to this: literacy rates for the four districts of Yakawlang, Panjao, Lal and Waras are 8% for men and only 0.5% for women. Only 2.7% of the adult population in this area attended primary school and only 1% secondary school.

The numbers of formal schools remain low throughout Hazarajat and in some districts, for example Dai Kundi, are almost non-existent. In general the situation is now worse than it was before the war, although Yakawlang seems to be an exception to this. Lack of teachers' salaries, lack of materials and lack of any form of refresher training for teachers remain key problems, and because of this there are major problems with quality even in those areas where schools are functioning. Chances to progress beyond the basics are few indeed. Bamiyan University was (re) established in the mid-1990s, but is currently closed because of the security situation. Security problems have also sometimes brought about temporary closure of schools — all of the formal schools in Lal were closed for this reason in 1999 — but where security has improved there appears to be a strong local commitment to re-establishing schools, most notably in Waras.

Given the lack of formal education services, the main form of education is winter schools (including mosque schools), run both by the communities themselves and by agencies. In the four districts of Yakawlang, Panjao, Waras and Lal, for example, almost all valleys had at least one winter school, supported either by an agency or by the community, and many had several. The community-supported schools in the main only taught the Koran, but this appeared to be due to lack of any additional materials rather than a question of policy and all those interviewed said they would teach other subjects as well if materials were made available. Girls are often taught with boys in the early years, but if they wish to continue beyond the age of 12 years separate provision needs to be available.

The Taliban restrictions on girls attending school have not affected Hazarajat as much as most other areas. Agencies have been able to get agreements to continue girls' schooling and even women's literacy courses, and in some cases local authorities are still running girls' schools. In all 2,707 girls were known to have attended school in 1999, with another 652

older girls and women going to women's literacy classes. During the same period 17,017 boys were recorded as attending school. Whilst NGOs appear to be the prime movers for girls' education, communities do sometimes educate girls (either in mixed classes or separate classes) even where there is no agency involvement. The main constraint in the last year has been fear: in the winter of 1998/99 local people were very anxious about doing things that might bring down Taliban wrath and some therefore would not send their daughters to school; girls' attendance rates are likely to show a significant increase in 2000.

Ironically, the lack of effective aid strategy has proved more of an obstacle to girls' education than Taliban policies. Although there is some agency activity (Oxfam, supported by UNICEF and WFP, have supported both non-formal and to a lesser extent formal education in the districts in which they work, Shuhada are supporting education for girls any boys in the districts in which they work, SCA have supported some schools in Yakawlang and OPS have provided books to the formal system), there is no overall strategy and schools still struggle to get books, salaries, stationery and blackboards. Moreover, monitoring has largely been about numbers attending — almost always large, there is no lack of enthusiasm for education, from parents or pupils — and there has been little real assessment of the quality of what goes on inside the classroom. There has also been a lack of work on how to maintain literacy skills in a largely non-literate environment — outside the classroom people get little chance to access reading materials and much could be done to integrate literacy into other programmes and to provide very basic village libraries. Recently, however, there have been efforts to get a more co-ordinated strategy on education, involving implementing agencies on the ground and UNICEF and SC-US.

Because of the low level of education provision, the majority of the educated are those who returned from Kabul or returnees from Iran. This is not only true in relation to academic schooling but also technical skills. In Panjao, for example, there were about 60 families coming and going from Iran and they often had secondary education and/or skills, e.g. mason, mechanics, carpenters. They were seen to be well qualified compared to locals — even those with only primary schooling were said to have good quality education compared to what was available locally.

Other services

There is no provision of other services such as agricultural extension or rural development in the Hazarajat area. In terms of the aid community, FAO is the most significant provider/supporter of services, with work in crops and livestock.

A number of veterinary clinics have been established through FAO and partner implementing agencies, but still not all districts are so served. Dai Kundi for example, has no clinic. FAO used to give medicines, vaccines and some salary and other operational support, but funding constraints have meant that the levels of support have reduced over recent years. Salary support was still available in 1999, but many agencies found they had to supply medicines

and many vaccines. There have also been problems with storage and expiry dates of vaccines.[58] At the time of writing it is unclear what support will be forthcoming in 2000.

Although FAO and some NGOs have had agricultural programmes involving improved seed, they have not reached many areas to any significant degree. For example, FAO brought 5 MT of improved seed and 10 MT of fertiliser to Sharistan in 1999 and similar amounts to Waras, Lal and Panjao, with a larger programme in Yakawlang. Bamiyan saw a more sustained programme under a joint Solidarites/FAO project.

[58] ACF, 1998, p98

Section 4. Recommendations

On future process

The experience of carrying out this study has made the following points clear:

- *There is significant agency commitment to developing a shared framework for research, analysis and evaluation.*
- *The only way to collect detailed information on the situation in Hazarajat over a number of years is to incorporate the data collection into the ongoing work of agencies working there — any other method would be both prohibitively expensive and liable to yield data of dubious quality.*
- *Although significant data exists in relation to the situation in Hazarajat, there are also serious gaps.*
- *The lack of a common methodology makes comparison across districts difficult.*

It is therefore recommended that:

- *The SMU supports the idea that this study be used as a starting point from which agencies can together design a more comprehensive data collection process for the year 2000, using the same methodology in all districts.*
- *That a series of indicators be developed that will enable comparisons within and across districts, and over time (see next section for suggestions on this).*
- *That the research design process be linked into the RCB structure and sectoral working groups set up as part of that, as well as, where appropriate, national working groups.*
- *That links are developed with PROMIS to look at how the data gathered can be mapped for use at a field level, as well as to provide an information base to donors and other interested parties.*
- *It is suggested that a yearly stock-taking report be published and that this is timed to link to a winter planning meeting/workshop and could be used as the basis for setting assistance targets for the following season.*

Indicators

This section suggests indicators which could be developed by SMU and agencies working in Hazarajat (along with other interested parties where appropriate) over the coming season and then monitored on an ongoing basis. It is suggested that over the course of 2000 a composite livelihoods/food security index be developed, if successful this notion could then be extended to encompass other areas and produce an overall vulnerability/poverty index and alongside it some form of recovery index.

Civil and political rights

This is the most difficult area in which to develop indicators as many aspects do not succumb to quantitative measures and qualitative measures can easily be manipulated. However, there are some things that can be done. Numbers of those displaced should be collected on a district level, with reasons for displacement. Also numbers of civilians killed in fighting, numbers of summary executions, and of arbitrary detentions. As it is not really

There have been three main sources of data for the study: published reports; unpublished, and usually unanalysed, records of agencies; and — for Waras, Lal, Yakawlang, Panjao, parts of Dai Kundi and Sharistan — the gathering of new data. The gathering of new data was done by both questionnaire at a valley level and semi-structured key informant interviews at a district level. Copies of the questionnaire and the subject headings for the semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix F and G. In all 104 questionnaires were completed.

The data for Waras, Lal, Yakawlang, Panjao and parts of Dai Kundi was gathered with help from Oxfam, whilst in Sharistan ACF did a considerable amount of new survey work for this report. This data is analysed and presented in the main report at a district level; the valley-level information from which the findings have been complied can be found in the appendices. Because of the way in which the data was gathered (see below), all of the valley-level data needs to be read as indicative rather than absolute.

Methodological problems

Data in Afghanistan is notoriously unreliable. The last census was in 1979 and was aborted part way through because of the war — there has been no attempt in Hazarajat to do a systematic population survey since that time. Any overall statistics are therefore at best guess-timates. The last comprehensive set of reports to be issued for the country was the UNIDATA reports of 1999. So much has changed since then that, though an extremely useful historical reference point, they cannot be used for present day planning.[4] There has been some attempt to get data — both quantitative and qualitative — at a local level in Hazarajat but these studies are topic-specific and only cover particular locations. What we have, therefore, is a patchy picture, giving us insights into aspects of the problem but not an overall analysis.

In trying to build a more comprehensive analysis, a number of problems were encountered. Firstly, there were difficulties with the unit of analysis. It was clear that in order to get meaningful data it was necessary to go below the level of district; the question was what was the best unit to choose. Village was rejected because there are so many of them and because there is no agreement as to what constitutes the boundaries of a village. Manteqa was rejected because it was seen as too big. After much discussion with Afghan colleagues, the unit of nawa (valley) was chosen as giving the right level of breakdown and assurances were given that everyone would agree on what area constituted a nawa. The practice was not so simple. Not all areas broke down into nawas, not everyone agreed on the composition of some nawas and within a nawa there were often different understandings of what constituted the boundaries of a particular village.

Problems were also encountered in making the figures from different data sets match up, a problem which highlights the difficulties of undertaking field research in Afghanistan. For example, the Oxfam figures for land distribution by ser[5], taken from figures initially compiled at the time of the 1998 WFP food distribution, record different populations from those given in the 1999 survey forms. Inquiry into this problem revealed three issues:

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[4] UNIDATA provincial studies, UNDP/OPS and UNOCA, 1991

[5] 1 ser equals 7 kg

possible to develop an absolute measure of other aspects, such as the general sense of security, or legitimacy of governing structures, it is suggested that instead an attempt is made to measure change. This could be done by making an assessment on an annual basis as to whether, in each of the areas listed below, the situation has improved, worsened, or stayed the same as that found in the previous year. Information should be gathered from a group of agency staff and local community leaders, people who have known political affiliations should be excluded from the sample. Information would be gathered at a district level, sub divided where appropriate. The detailed indicators should be finalised with the key agencies working in Hazarajat, in consultation with the RCB, but the following provides a starting point.

1. Security: district level review — do people feel they can travel safely, do they feel safe in their houses etc

2. Social tensions: are ethnic/group relations improving/worsening

3. Governance: at a district level, is there less/greater sense of legitimacy; are the authorities providing more/fewer services

4. Community: what community structures exist, how strong are they (activities/ participation/ability to resolve disputes)

5. Changes perceived in strengths and weaknesses of communities

6. Gender: attitudes to women; women's participation in public life/activities; women's/girls' education

7. Population movements: numbers of people leaving each district (or zone within district); numbers returning; numbers displaced into each district.

Livelihood and food security

This section needs co-ordinating with the WFP VAM unit as agencies will not want to gather information twice over. Work has already begun between the four international agencies working on livelihoods in Hazarajat to produce a shared framework and co-ordinated approach on this. Here both absolute values and changing patterns would be recorded. One aim would be to develop a composite livelihood/food security vulnerability index (this could build on work done by ACF) for districts, zones within districts and socio-economic groups. Key areas of interest are:

- *Land distribution patterns, by district and zone within district (as part of developing measure of vulnerability to food insecurity)*
- *Wheat: yields; prices; availability*
- *Changes in agricultural practice*
- *Livestock: numbers and holding patterns; farm gate prices; grazing rights*
- *Other economic assets; types, prices where appropriate*
- *Main livelihood patterns (numbers of teachers, traders etc)*
- *Remittances/out migration*

- *Poverty indicators: levels of borrowing; mortgaging of land; dependence on charity; changes in expenditure patterns/food consumption patterns*
- *Environmental degradation: erosion control measures; land reclamation/degradation; time to get fuelwood*

Health

This section needs to be developed with the health sectoral group in Hazarajat. It will look at:

- *Health facilities — clinics, numbers and how well they are functioning*
- *Community based health care: levels of access to trained dias; health education*
- *Reproductive health care, including pregnancy services and family planning*
- *Links between health and schools*
- *Vaccination rates*
- *Mortality, morbidity and malnutrition*
- *Water and sanitation*

Education

It is suggested that indicators are developed with the Afghanistan-wide sectoral group on education, along with agencies working in Hazarajat in the education sector. They would include qualitative and quantitative measures such as:

- *Formal schools and informal schools per district — number; number of pupils (gender disaggregated); whether or not there is agency support; subjects taught; levels of materials/equipment*
- *Levels of learning; relevance of curriculum*
- *Adult education — availability; numbers attending*
- *Levels of literacy/numeracy*

Assistance activity

This would map where assistance activity was going, both in relation to geography and sector, as against analysed need. It would also chart where and to what extent co-ordinated programming was happening, and the benefits and problems associated with it.

Appendix A: Political history of Hazarajat from 1979 onwards

In 1979 the *Shura-e-Ittifaq* was formed under the leadership of Beheshti and Sayyeds who gained control over top positions. The impetus for its establishment was external threat. It remained the most powerful political force in Hazarajat until 1982/83 when it was challenged by the Islamists. The first phase of the Shura was one of unity, with Sayyed in alliance with mir against the external threat. The second phase was one of conflict (the external threat had withered) in which the Sayyed, supported by sheikhs (religious clergy, trained as opposed to by descent - though some Sayyeds also became sheikhs), turned against secular groups and established full control. The loser was the mir and many left the country.

From the beginning the Shura placed heavy burdens of conscription and taxation on its citizens and it began to lose popular support because of the gap between what it demanded and what it offered. The Sayyeds were also an endogamous group defined by lineage. There was no way anyone not a Sayyed could become a Sayyed and this acted against their popularity. Finally, their networks were largely limited to Hazarajat, which reduced their wider influence.

The period 1982/83 to 1989 was one of intense internal fighting in Hazarajat with the emergence of Hazara groups backed by Iran. People were disillusioned with the Shura and the Islamists were the only credible challenging force. They had also been more reasonable in things like taxation in areas under their command. The Islamists challenged the Shura and by 1983/84 had defeated it and taken over as the dominant political force in the region, but fighting continued. The key groups in the new movement were *Nasr* and the newly establish *Sepah-e-Pasdaran*, a branch of Iranian Pasdaran. Nasr was more Hazara nationalist, Pasdaran the more Islamist and pro-Khomeni. The Islamists operated in modern form of organisation where individual achievement replaced proscribed status, so opening the way for new people. They also built schools with support of local people and improved roads.

The other group of significance was *Harakat*. Limited size, but militarily strong, it espoused a more moderate Islamism and opposed many aspects of Khomeni's doctrine. It was found mainly along the eastern and northern borders of Hazarajat. The strength of Harakat was broken in the early 1990s and it was not much seen in the area until 1998 when it came to Yakawlang.

Hizb-i-Wahdat was formed in 1989, in part at least due to pressure from Iran. For a time it brought a measure of unity to Hazarajat and following the downfall of Najib's government in 1992 it became one of the main political forces in the country. Wahdat mobilised its support around a common core of Hazara identity. Whilst officially it has an Islamist framing and is not an exclusive party, in reality it is a Hazara movement with a strong tone of nationalism. Although it brought together all key Hazara groups, perhaps because they couldn't afford to be marginalised, it was dominated by Pasdaran and Nasr - and the clergy were as dominant in Wahdat as they had been in these groups. The multi-ethnic Harakat split and the Hazara factions joined Wahdat. The mir became re-integrated into Wahdat, though they never acquired their former status. Also those from radical secular groups were brought back as

their skills were needed. The party had a measure of popular support in Kabul and took on some of the functions of a civilian organisation as well as a military one.

Mazari, Wahdat's first leader, did his religious studies in Najaf and Qom and brought together ethnic, religious and political leadership. He was captured and later killed in 1993 during the fall of west Kabul to the Taliban. The party moved its HQ to Bamiyan and Khalili, a prominent Shia intellectual and mullah, took over. Akbari, then a relatively unknown person whose forefathers were Quizilabash traders from Kabul who bought lands and then went to Najaf in Iraq and later to Iran, split off from Khalili. The struggle between these two men and their followers was responsible for much of the insecurity in Hazarajat in the years up to the Taliban take-over.

Appendix B: Social and political structures

The imprint of Hazarajat's feudal past still conditions relationships between landlord and landless and determines systems of patronage and employment, exploitation and welfare. The basic unit is the family, essentially the group of people living and eating under one roof. It can be a nuclear family (man, wife and unmarried children),[59] an extended family (married sons and sons and their wives and children); or a larger units, which can include servants or landless peasants and their families who have no kinship link but have economic ties – perhaps best described as joint household.[60] Traditionally, the leadership structure was built up from family units, with the highest unit in the hierarchy being the *qaum* (perhaps best translated into English as clan), whose head was traditionally the mir. The mir see themselves as the original Hazaras and as a separate group. There was said to be some tension between them and others because of this:

> *"The mir see themselves as better but many others don't accept, some do but not those who have been out of the country."*

With the consolidation of the Afghan state the mir became middle men, clients of the state themselves and looking after their own clients' interests by providing goods from the state, or resolving conflicts with the state. However, they were often unable to gain much from state and were experienced as exploitative by those below them. They survived because there wasn't much alternative form of leadership and because the space for horizontal solidarity in Hazara relations was small. When the PDPA took power they had no room for the mir, whose power declined further.

The clergy were traditionally the next most powerful section of Hazara society and were made up of Sayyeds and mullahs. Mullahs who were also Sayyed had significantly more influence than those who were not – they not only had religious influence but also enjoyed economic benefits and were often big landowners themselves. Sayyeds often reached high positions of social and political leadership and became the most powerful mirs. However, changes have taken place over the years, particularly with religious leaders gaining more power. The 1980s in particular were a time of great social change and transition. The struggle against the Soviets brought in new political ideas and allegiance ceased to be based solely on family, clan or tribal allegiances. The traditional leaders lost much of their power and the new leaders were the leaders of local groups and commanders. The struggle against the government was accompanied by internal struggle.

Whilst Hazarajat is predominately poor, there are a few who are wealthy, or relatively so, and these patterns of wealth have changed over the past 20 years. Once the landlords were wealthy and powerful, now they are much less so, though this varies from district to district. In Lal there are still large landowners, in Yakawlang the division of land has meant that only two or three families now have more than 50 jeribs. In the place of the landlords the new wealthy are the traders, a group whose prosperity has increased over the last 20 years.

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[59] Nuclear families are not very common. Madera, for example, found they made up only 4% of the people working on its cash for work road programme.

[60] ~~ref. Mousavi~~

Although the traders were once mainly from outside the area, now many of them are local people who initially made their wealth outside Afghanistan. As an informant in Waras explained:

> *"20 years ago there were no shopkeepers from local community, all of them were from Kabul, Ghazni etc. The local ones got their wealth initially from outside, they were refugees mainly Iran; it is still happening, they are purchasing goods in Iran for refugees and sending them back to Hazarajat."*

Conflict can, however, bring about reversals: in Yakawlang and Bamiyan a large number of local traders left for Ghazni and even Kabul. New traders linked to the new power-holders arrived, often selling the looted goods of their predecessors.

Though wealthy, the traders were not necessarily seen as having power - this belonged to the commanders and the mullahs. Big commanders, those having maybe 20 soldiers or more, were all said to be mullahs, although anyone could be a small commander. With the Taliban many of the previous commanders lost power, whilst the mullahs and sometimes the old elite saw an increase in power. As one informant from Waras explained:

> *"It was the commanders, now it is the landlords, it changed last year - those who have less are encouraged to fight, if you have land you are less interested in fighting."*

Appendix C: Population

Reliable population data is extremely difficult to come by. In 1979 the total population of Hazarajat was reckoned to be 1.5m, 10% of the country's total. By 1999 estimates were varying from 1.6m to 2.5m. There has been no census since the one aborted in 1979, no reliable estimates of population growth since then and population figures are made more difficult by movements in and out of the area. The table below shows population data when that has been estimated by agencies are working in some districts, sometimes using the number of families per village multiplied by a average family size of 7. Other population data comes from Eighmy estimates for 1990 projected at an annual 2% growth rate to 1999.[61] Eighmy data is also given for comparison in districts where there are agency figures. It is noticeable that agency figures are always much higher.[62]

	Agency estimate of households	Agency estimates of population	Population based on Eighmy estimates
Bamiyan**	14,595	93,652	73,932
Shebar			30,089
Yakawlang*	16,040	112,280	78,366
Panjao*	11,742	82,194	56,288
Waras*	18,161	127,127	97,743
Lal*	14,228	99,596	82,799
Dai Kundi			152,567
Sharistan			102,999
Malistan			79,000
Jaghori			152,000
Nawur			98,000
Behsud 1	39,742 (1&2)		50,000
Behsud 2			117,000

** Solidarites figure

* Oxfam figure

If computed on a straight people per sq. km basis, population densities appear quite low (e.g. 61/sq. km for Behsud), but this is somewhat misleading as most of the area is barren. When re-calculated on the basis of people per sq. km of cultivatable land[i], the density (1,210 for Behsud) is greater than that of Bangladesh, which has little wasteland and is one of the

[61] See *An indicative plan for food security rapid response activities in Hazarajat*, 1999, Hazarajat Food Security Co-ordination group, Islamabad May 1999.

[62] ~~The recent census in Kabul also gave figures 50% higher than previous estimates.~~

most densely populated areas of the world.[63] It is thus unsurprising to find that the area cannot feed itself.

The population of Hazarajat is predominately young. For example in both Panjao and Yakawlang it was estimated that 40% of the population were less than 15 years old, whilst in Waras the figure was reckoned to be 60% and another 30% were said to be between 15 and 45. The average age for women was said to be between 45 and 50 and for men 55. Whilst these are probably no more than guess-timates, they do reflect the low life expectancy of women, due to multiple child bearing coupled with poor diet. Again, more work could usefully be done.

[63] Madera/Solidarites

Appendix D: District level security

The notes here give a profile of the recent history and the 1999 security situation. They aim to provide a baseline from which it will be possible to chart whether or not security improves in 2000.

Bamiyan suffered the worst of the violence in 1999 and still has not recovered. Solidarites reported that of a total of 9,397 houses, 1,610 were 100% destroyed (17%); 1,138 were 50% destroyed (12%) and 812 less than 50% destroyed (8.6%) during in the May capture of Bamiyan. The destruction also led to a massive loss of livelihood with cultivated land reduced from 31,703 jeribs in 1998 to only 12,067 in 1999, giving an estimated wheat yield of 3,105 tonnes as against an estimated requirement of 15,038 tonnes - a deficit of 11,933 tonnes. The potato yield was estimated to be down from 7,076 tonnes in 1998 to 2,351 tonnes in 1999. The loss of livestock was large: cows reduced from 23,124 to 14,928 (64% of former size); goats from 22,030 to 11,031 (50%); sheep from 61,312 to 40,876 (66%). There were many reports of human rights abuses against civilians and

Yakawlang went to the Taliban in September 1998, was briefly re-captured by Wahdat at the beginning of December, went back to the Taliban a day later and then saw general insecurity with frequent shifts of control throughout the winter. The Taliban finally re-took Yakawlang in spring 1999 following their re-capture of Bamiyan. There were fears that the violence experienced in Bamiyan would spread to Yakawlang and a lot of families fled, especially those in the district centre or living along the main roads. In fact the violence was minimal, although for some time the area was very militarised and there was a high level of fear amongst the inhabitants.

With the departure of most of the non-local Taliban (initial forces included both Afghan Taliban from outside Hazarajat and Pakistanis) and the setting in motion of a political process of 'reconciliation', the district has seen an improved security situation over 1999. Some people now see it as better than the time before the Taliban, when there were big problems in some villages with disputes about land and access to the mountains - now, it is reported, the Taliban say that the mountains belong to the government and are free for everyone.

Yakawlang is governed more directly by Taliban than other districts apart from Bamiyan, although the number of Taliban is still small. Akbari was seen as having some support because he kept Yakawlang from burning and killing during the Taliban capture of the town but he was not seen as having real power.

Lal at the end of 1999 was still under the control of Hizb-i-Wahdat and although it had suffered periods of insecurity during the year there had been no major fighting. Wahdat forces there have separated into Khalili and Irfani (Khalili's old deputy) factions. Over recent years there have been numerous security problems in the district - not major fighting but enough to shut the bazaar and stop aid agency work.

> *"In Lal always the people worry because always there's been two parties fighting."*

> *"Ordinary people have a lot of worry about security, fear that T will come from Chagcharan and Uruzgan and Yakawlang."*

- *Firstly, in some areas there were significant population movements between 1998 and 1999.*
- *Secondly, different informants had different ideas of what constituted a particular village or valley.*
- *Finally, the population records drawn from figures collected for the 1998 WFP distributions were (unsurprisingly) in the opinion of the staff likely to have been somewhat inflated in the hope of thus gaining more wheat.*

Such problems occur in all data collection in Afghanistan and it is important to recognise them.

Because data has been pulled together from various sources it is difficult to get comparisons across districts, though of course one can make comparisons within subsets of data (e.g. within Oxfam's work or within ACF's previously published studies). ACF and Oxfam did work on shared survey methodology for this study and this is being built upon for next year, with all the major agencies currently working on an agreement on what information to collect and a shared methodology for doing this.

The information presented in this report is also uneven in its detail. Given the way the study was undertaken that was inevitable. There is very little information available for the areas in which there is no agency working; and even where agencies are working, different ones collect different information for different purposes. This was the first time the aid community had tried to bring together information in this way and co-operation was excellent. Nevertheless, pressures of time, remoteness of some locations and difficulties of communications meant that everything could not be done to the same level of detail in all areas. What is needed, however, is enough information to be sure we are working in the right areas, and good baseline information when we start working in new areas. Where there are significant gaps, the aim is to fill them over the coming season.

Finally, because data had to be gathered over a very limited time period at the end of the season (October-November), it was impossible to iron out all the problems with translation or to properly train local researchers. It is, therefore, important that data gathered newly for this report is treated as indicative rather than absolute.

Structure of report

The analytical part of this report is divided into three major sections — a social and political profile; livelihoods and food security; and access to services, primarily health and education. This is followed by a series of recommendations for taking the process forward and developing a more systematic research, monitoring and analysis capacity at field level, linked to agency planning and programming. The information in each section is backed up by supporting appendices including, where available, valley-level data. Useful background information is also given in narrative appendices, as is a list of agencies working and a profile of their work.

On a number of occasions during the last year the bazaar has closed for a time and those who could left the district centre for safer places. The Oxfam office in Lal centre never felt it safe enough to re-install the radio, or to fully re-equip its offices.

Panjao: Despite the arrival of the Kuchis, security in Panjao centre was better in 1999 than previous years, although the areas bordering Lal sometimes experienced insecurity. Prior to the Taliban capture of the district, Panjao had been split between Akbari and Khalili and experienced regular bouts of insecurity. The Taliban have used old traditional leaders who had been out of the political scene and there is said to be a partnership between these elders and Akbari, but also competition between elders and mullahs.

Waras at present is seen as the most secure district in Hazarajat, a contrast to a few years ago when it used to be the least. This is said to be due to changing politics and the exit of Khalili's group. In general informants felt that security was OK for ordinary people and that the big strength was that the road was open and people could freely send animals to market. Although there were some incidents in 1999, these were seen as particular political incidents not a sign of general insecurity.

Dai Kundi has seen lots of internal fighting and security has been poor over recent years, though this year was said to be a bit better. Security in most of Dai Kundi improved in late autumn 1999 when Amini, the former commander in Ashtarlai, was appointed by Akbari and the Taliban to be in charge of the district. But not all commanders recognise his authority and there are still pockets of instability. The area of Sang Takht, in particular, remained insecure and this stopped a planned emergency food distribution for late 1999.

> *"Dai Kundi has suffered much more than other districts; you can't find the old leadership, because of fighting these people have gone, their lands have been distributed to the strong commanders."*

Sharistan: Political power in Sharistan has been in the hands of the Afghari family for the last 15 years. Afghari concluded a deal with the Taliban in July and with his two brothers imposed a reign of terror on the district. Afghari was killed in October 1999, for reasons that are still not clear, and his brothers now control the majority of Sharistan district but security is not good.

Behsud: Security in Behsud was quite good in 1999.

Appendix E: Local governance

Lal: Nothing functioning, only military commanders.

Yakawlang: Uluswal and deputy uluswal collecting taxes from bazaar and villages on main road. Education – barely functioning, since last Sept schools closed, have no salaries for staff but work with SCA – 3 or 4 girls' schools, 20 boys schools, secondary school and high school. Newly established agric dept, economic affairs, security and court, financial dept, taxes and land disputes, functioning.

Waras: Education functioning. Financial dept collects taxes, mostly from shops and trucks, mostly used to pay soldiers, justice, police.

Dai Kundi: Ashtarlai, nothing at all, the political structure is in Khader. Do have some links, collect taxes. Uluswal doesn't visit here because distance too far, Panjao much closer. Amini religious leader, in charge of everything. In Khader there is some fort of government. Alim Beg is uluswal but no real control.

Panjao: Education dept said to have been 'just a name'; 6 boys schools functioning but no salaries for teachers, no new books for 20 years, but recently things improved, Akbari brought decree from Kabul that teachers salaries should be paid from usher. 46 teachers, every school has head. There is a new head of Education dept, a graduate from Balkh University, faculty of literature. Finance; security – this is said to be the most powerful part of the administration.

Appendix F: Land and livelihood by district

Yakawlang: 70% of the cultivated land is irrigated. *Landholdings* are small, most people have only 1-10 jeribs and no more than 25 families have more than 50 or 60. The number of *orchards* has increased due to influences from outside the region; the number of poplars has become less because of cutting and there are problems of protection from livestock. Everyone has right to *grazing* land and to the collecting of fuelwood. This is organised on a village level. Sometimes rangelands are divided on family by family basis; other times in common. *Animal husbandry* is well developed, 50% of families go to Eylaq in summer, mainly the women and kids. *Kuchis* are not really a problem in Yakawlang, they have no right to rangeland in Yakawlang and only some grazing rights in Band-i-Amir.

Dai Kundi: Irrigated land makes up 70% of the cultivated area, although in some areas there is no rainfed land at all. *Landholdings:* the number of families with only very little land is very high, estimated by Oxfam at over 90%, although number of landless is lower than in other parts of Hazarajat. Except around Ashtarlai, there are few families with enough land to have sharecroppers. Almost all of those without land are also without livestock. In the winter of 1998/99 many families survived only by selling the last of their assets.

> *"People are very poor, villages look good from outside, inside they have nothing."*

Though *landholdings* are small the district has some of the best *land utilisation* in whole of Hazarajat; except in the north and east it is possible to get double cropping and there are commercial fruit trees. Although everyone has access to what *grazing* there is, *livestock holdings* are generally low because of lack of pasture. The result is that the area is more dependent on work outside than other districts:

> *"If one stays at home, three or four out to look for work."*

Kuchis from Jalalabad have rights to graze the hills but don't have land; they haven't yet come back to Dai Kundi but there is fear that they will and that they will stop Hazaras grazing hills. However, it is said that they can't reach all of Dai Kundi

Waras: 80% of the cultivated land is irrigated. Mostly people are small landowners, with between 1 and 5 jeribs, and a quarter of the population are landless. *Livestock* patterns: mostly sheep and because of the small landholdings livestock are very important. Lack of fodder and disease are the key problems. In 1999 people were said to be leaving area because they can't pay *Kuchi* demands. *Orchards* are not significant.

Lal: is different to most parts of Hazarajat in that cultivation is 70-80% rainfed. But, although it has always been a rainfed area, the extent used to be less because of restrictions and in last 20 years rainfed cultivation has increased greatly. *Landholdings:* Lal is also a district of big landlords - about 40 landowners have more than 100 jeribs and about 20 farmers have 200. There is a correspondingly high proportion of landlessness - 35-40%. The district has highest *livestock* population in Hazarajat and in the past there was always conflict between Kuchi and Hazara because of this. A *Kuchi* return would make a tremendous difference to Lal. Kirman, which has best rangelands, used to all Kuchi land from the bazaar to Safi Dewal. Sar-e-Jangal was also big Kuchi area. The Kuchis also have other assets, including lots of *trees* and 12 *mills*. Some people still pay rent to Kuchis, the amount varying from place to

place; in Kirman for 50 sers seed a farmer pays 50 sers on harvest, in Lal 60 sers, in Sar-e-Jangal 50. In one place, Girdwalang, instead of taking wheat the Kuchis make people plant 2,000 trees for every 50 sers. Although in Daoud Khan's time *grazing* land was put into public domain, this was never put into practice and the pattern is that it is either divided between villages and/or within villages. The landless have rights to grazing, so landless can be better off than small landowners if they have, say, 50 sheep. It is thought that Kuchis will allow grazing, but not rainfed cultivation, and there are fears that they might claim for last 20 years, which would have big impact on food security.

Panjao: 40% of crop is lalmi (rainfed). *Kuchis* also have major claims to land in Panjao. The original decree gave them the rights to land over 3000m in northern mountains but by the late 1970s they were using almost all the pastures of Panjao. Although at the time of democracy there was a decree that all *grazing* lands belonged to the government, this was never implemented, as Kuchis were so powerful. Conflicts between Hazaras and Kuchis over grazing were said to be common. Kuchis also had irrigated land: 20 years ago in Tagobarg they had irrigated land of 20 villages totalling 400 jeribs, in Ghurghuri 200 jeribs, in Gandab, 50 and in Akzarat 50.

Nawor: High plateau provides good *pasture land* and sustains important numbers of *livestock.* Vegetables tend to be grown in kitchen gardens

Behsud: In the villages surveyed by Madera the proportion of landless people had reduced by 12.7% compared to before the war, though the percentage of villages without landless people had decreased slightly, from 67% before the war to 65.5%. In 1996, 99% of villages had a daily *grazing* area and 1.8% also had a summer grazing area. In 1996 more than 99% of families in both Behsud I and II were *animal owners. Orchards* have become more important: in Behsud II the percentage of villages with at least one orchard increased from 7.2% before the war to 30.8% in 1996.

Appendix G: Baseline survey – Tenants and sharecroppers

These tables show:

- *the numbers of families in villages/valleys*
- *the numbers of tenant and sharecropper families in the community.*

District: Yakawlang

Region	Village	Families	Tenants	Share-croppers
Qume Aba	Sukhtagi	260	52	34
	Chel Borch	260	52	16
	Sachak	340	10	44
	Sabz Dara	475	14	280
Kote sadat	Band Amir	502	15	50
	Dara Ali	425	4	13
	Sari Bolaq	150	0	30
Sia Dara	Bakak	114	1	4
Totals		2,526	148	471
Percentages			5.9	18.6

District: Panjao

Village	Families	Tenants	Share-croppers
Tagabarg	960	120	120
Nargis	450	50	250
Marka	1,140	200	370
Akhzarat	2,000	1,000	500
Gandab	1,210	500	300
Gudar	240	100	60
Sagdis/Tarbulaq	1,800	200	400
Miankawag	427	90	37
Targai	540	40	100
Tarapas	340	10	80
Mohr	600	40	120
Ghurghuri	820	300	210
Naiqul	690	40	80
Darazgul	363	10	100
Totals	11,580	2,700	2,727
Percentage		23	24

District: Waras

Valley/Village	Families	Tenants	Share-croppers
Dola	246	12	60
Gero-e-Sarab	226	14	54
Sar-e Sarab	412	20	103
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	403	20	80
Sourkh Kawak	126	6	37
Tagabghar	180	9	9
Ligan	412	119	54
Pajandor	228	11	23
Sari Takht	924	92	92
Qulbatoo (Takht)	828	0	166
Qumi ghaib Ali	260	10	70
Chigin (Waras)	911	91	182
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	224	34	22
Tagab (Surk Joui)	700	238	112
Qumi Barfi/Qumi Khudi	450	158	68
Qumi Mirza	339	10	68
Qumi Yari	326	81	59
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	1,046	52	209
Binigaw/Petab Joui	1,120	56	280
Sultan Rubat/Bastook	880	11	56
Fato	240	84	48
Petab Qul	244	37	49
Shahi	502	75	75
Qunuq/Qara Ghojor/Quf Qul	1,015	203	152
Totals	12,242	1,443	2,128
Percentage		12	17

District: Lal

Manteqa	Village	Families	Tenants	Share-croppers
Lal	Qurabagha/Jawqul	177	25	18
	Dahane Qulani	232	65	35
	Qalai Chaka	50	40	0
	Saqaba	165	31	34
	Shakraki	105	8	15
	Petab Lal Miana	293	25	40
	Dewalak	99	12	10
	Manju	125	55	5
	Naw Abad/Naw Agha	171	21	33
	Petab Lal Markaz	165	18	20
	Esar	129	40	31
	Qalacha	105	0	0
Kirman	Giroy	175	69	50
	Brishtogag	80	55	15
Talkhak	Shaknouka	59	6	10
Sarijangal	Naw-e Takaghal	395	40	100
	Giroy Sarijangal	243	20	30
	Shenya Chaperqul	122	15	30
Totals		2,890	545	476
Percentages			19	16

District: Dai Kundi

	Valley	Families	Tenants	Share-croppers
Baghal Qundo	Tato	35	0	10
	Margha	30	0	6
	Gochan	96	0	16
	Mondah	96	0	20
Ashtarlie	Rangdarakht	77	0	17
	Chuwosh	40	0	0
	Chuwosh Sofly	61	0	10
	Raskaman	102	0	6
	New daraz	40	1	3
	Miansoflu	72	0	0
Jingan	Siarig	40	0	6
Totals		689	1	94
Percentage			0	14

District: Sharistan

Valley	Families nawa	villages	Tenants	Share-croppers
Norukhsai	230	65	0	0
Bardez	200	68	0	2
Hoowe	320	55	0	1
Denu	250	64	0	0
Eskan	539	123	2	25
Bogh	295	73	0	5
Bargee	590	89	1	7
Loe	150	52	0	0
Sangan	380	78	0	13
Tai Bargar	285	66	0	0
Mir Boi	140	108	0	9
Petab Sulfa	76	76	0	1
Petab Ulya	90	71	0	0
Kermak	85	40	0	4
Safed Choob	84	88	0	2
Gharghara Ulya	112	112	0	0
Nawar Katagak	115	100	0	0
Deh Balae Kalam	78	68	0	0
Nairiak Sulfa	63	53	0	0
Doost Bek	61	60	0	0
Safed Pusta Ulya	108	108	0	4
Sayah Qoolak	94	74	0	0
Mooshmai	79	79	0	0
Pai Faiz Abad	95	95	0	11
Kul	59	48	0	18
Zenjook	49	49	0	6
Zardsang	79	58	0	7
Patanak	59	39	0	9
Tatrang	36	25	2	1
Wleyat Ghooch	38	38	0	10
Totals	4,839	2,122	5	135
Percentage			0.2	6.4

Appendix H: Baseline survey – Land yield

These tables show:

- *the yield per ser on rainfed land and irrigated land in a normal year*
- *the yield per ser on rainfed land, spring/kareze-fed land and river-fed land in 1999*

the average number of sers harvested/District: Yakawlang

Region	Village	Yield from 1 ser					Average harvest (sers)
		normal year		1999			
		rainfed	irrig	rainfed	Spring/ kareze	river	
Qume Aba	Sukhtagi	11	12.5	3	3	15	63,580
	Chel Borch	9	12.5	3.5	3	10	15,020
	Sachak	11	12.5	3	3	12	68,400
	Sabz Dara	11	12.5	3	3	13	30,240
Kote sadat	Band Amir	7	9	5	5	8	96,000
	Dara Ali	9	11	3	3	12	94,896
	Sari Bolaq	9	11	3	2.5	11	17,920
Sia Dara	Bakak	7	9.5	4	3	9	25,600
Totals		74	90.5	27.5	25.5	90	411,656
Average		9.3	11.3	3.4	3.2	11.3	

District: Panjao

Village	Yield from 1 ser				Average harvest (sers)
	Normal year		1999		
	Rainfed	irrig	rainfed	spring/ kareze	
Tagabarg	8	10	5	7	96,000
Nargis	7	8	6	5	24,000
Marka		0	6	4	60,000
Akhzarat	8	6	6	4	150,000
Gandab	8	5	5	3	110,000
Gudar	6	8	3	5	200,000
Sagdis/Tarbulaq	7	8	4	5	144,000
Miankawag	5	9	3	6	14,000
Targai	5	8	3	5	1,000
Tarapas	6	8	3	6	32,000
Mohr	7	9	3	5	40,000
Ghurghuri	6	9	4	5	90,000
Naiqul	6	8	3	5	40,000
Darazgul	6	8	3	6	8,000
Totals	85	104	57	71	1,009,000
Average	6.5	8	4.1	5.1	

District: Dai Kundi

	Valley	Yield from 1 ser		Average harvest (sers)
		rainfed	irrig	
Baghal Qundo	Tato	1	1.8	2,800
	Margha	1.5	0.8	2,300
	Gochan	4.5	5.5	10,000
	Mondah	7.5	7	14,500
Ashtarlie	Rangdarakht	1	4.	5,500
	Chuwosh			4,200
	Chuwosh Sofly			8,500
	Raskaman			9,000
	New daraz			8,000
	Miansoflu			
Jingan	Siarig			4,000
Totals				

Section 1. Social and Political Profile

The broader picture

Current political situation

The Taliban took Hazarajat in September 1998, following their capture of Mazar. Because of the widespread reports of massacres of Hazara civilians in Mazar, the Taliban arrival in Hazarajat was much feared, but in fact violence against civilians was limited. One reason for the lack of violence may have been that there was little military opposition — by the time the Taliban came to Hazarajat, Hizb-i-Wahdat was psychologically weak because of the fall of Mazar, and even more so when the Taliban reached central Hazarajat after the fall of Bamiyan. (Of the two main Wahdat groups, Khalili's men fled and Akbari went to Waras and tried to re-organise, but finding no support turned instead to negotiation.) Another reason may have been the international publicity and condemnation over what happened in Mazar. Reports were that the Taliban were very concerned over the international response; and certainly after formal international protests over events in Mazar, announcements went out over Taliban-controlled radio saying that civilians should not be harmed. Whatever the reason, Taliban forces soon withdrew from most of the area (the exceptions were Bamiyan and to some extent Yakawlang) and handed over to local leadership linked to Akbari. However, although Akbari rules, the real power still rests with the Taliban.

Unlike in many other areas, such as Kabul, the Taliban have not imposed strict codes of behaviour in Hazarajat — girls still go to school, women still wear their traditional dress rather than burqas, Shia Muslims pray according to their traditions. Mostly informants interpreted this as recognition by the Taliban that they could not control the area by force, particularly over the winters, and so desire to avoid provoking resistance. There was, however, a feeling that it might not last, that the Taliban were now having to concentrate on Massoud and that they might become stricter in Hazarajat if they gained military control of the whole country:

> *"They want to destroy the opposition but they recognise that they don't have enough power and so they have to negotiate."*

Whether or not this turns out to be true this perception is indicative of a certain wariness on the part of the local population.

There were numerous reports of relations between Taliban and Akbari being strained over 1999, but both parties probably need each other enough for the alliance to hang together for the time being.

Violence and security

In general people tended to look back on the period before the revolution as a period of peace when you could freely walk anywhere in the area, and to view the time since then as one of deterioration. These quotes, one from Dai Kundi and one from Yakawlang, were typical:

District: Waras

Village/Valley	Yield from 1 ser	
	Rainfed	Irrig
Dola	4	10
Gero-e-Sarab	4	9
Sar-e Sarab	5	8
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	5	8
Sourkh Kawak	4	10
Tagabghar	5	8
Ligan	4	8
Pajandor	5	10
Sari Takht	5	8
Qulbatoo (Takht)	3	8
Qumi ghaib Ali	4	8
Chigin (Waras)	5	7
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	4	8
Tagab (Surk Joui)	3	8
Qumi Barfi/Qumi Khudi	3	7
Qumi Mirza	3	8
Qumi Yari	5	10
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	4	10
Binigaw/Petab Joui	3	10
Sultan Rubat/Bastook	4	8
Fato	3	8
Petab Qul	4	8
Shahi	6	8
Qunuq/Qara Ghojor/Quf Qul	4	8
Totals	99	203
Average	4.1	8.5

District: Lal

Manteqa	Village	Yield from 1 ser					Average harvest (sers)
		Normal year		1999			
		Rainfed	irrig	rainfed	spring/ kareze	river	
Lal	Qurabagha/Jawqul	6	7	2	2	7	12,000
	Dahane Qulani	5	5	3	3	5	22,220
	Qalai Chaka	0	0	0	0	0	5,000
	Saqaba	8	6	2	3	6	17,000
	Shakraki	5	8	3	2	4	2,800
	Petab Lal Miana	5	6	2	1	4	50,000
	Dewalak	7	6	5	4	5	6,000
	Manju	7	7.5	3	2	0	16,000
	Naw Abad/Naw Agha	7	8	3.5	2	6	21,200
	Petab Lal Markaz	6	5	3	2	2	19,500
	Esar	7	5	4	3	6	12,500
	Qalacha	9	8	4	2	0	4,000
Kirman	Giroy	7	6	3	5	6	27,500
	Brishtogag	6	6	4.5	3	4	7,500
Talkhak	Shaknouka	6	7	3	2	4	5,000
Sarijangal	Naw-e Takaghal	8	10	5	3	6	47,400
	Giroy Sarijangal	8	7	5	3	5	37,500
	Shenya Chaperqul	7	6	4	3	5	20,500
Totals		114	113.5	59	45	75	333,620
Averages		6.3	6.3	3.3	2.5	4.2	

District: Sharistan

Valley	Yield from 1 ser					Average harvest (sers)
	Normal year		1999			
	Rainfed	Irrigated	rainfed	spring/ kareze	river	
Norukhsai		7		3	–	5,300
Bardez	–	5	–	2	–	4,300
Hoowe		8		2	–	4,900
Denu	–	7	–	3	–	7,000
Eskan	–	5	–	1	–	9,000
Bogh	–	5	–	2	–	5,500
Bargee	–	6	–	2	–	8,000
Loe	–	7	–	2	–	2,500
Sangan	–	5	–	1	–	5,600
Tai Bargar	–	7	–	3	–	5,000
Mir Boi	–	5.5	–	2	2.5	3,250
Petab Sulfa	–	5	–	2.5	–	1,750
Petab Ulya	–	4	–	2	–	1,200
Kermak	–	5.5	–	2	3	3,500
Safed Choob	–	4.5	–	2	3	1,250
Gharghara Ulya	–	6	–	–	3	3,000
Nawar Katagak	–	5	–	2	2	2,700
Deh Balae Kalam	–	5	–	–	2	2,000
Nairiak Sulfa	–	5	–	3	–	3,000
Doost Bek	–	6	–	–	3	2,400
Safed Pusta Ulya	–	5	–	2	–	3,500
Sayah Qoolak	–	5	–	–	3	2,000
Mooshmai	–	5.5	–	2	3	4,600
Pai Faiz Abad	–	6	–	–	3	3,000
Kul	–	6	–	3	–	3,600
Zenjook	–	7	–	3	–	7,000
Zardsang	–	6	–	2	–	6,000
Patanak	–	6	–	3	–	2,520
Tatrang	–	5	–	3	–	1,150
Wleyat Ghooch	–	6	–	3	–	2,340
Totals		171		57.5	27.5	116,860
Averages		5.7		2.3	2.7	

Appendix I Livestock

These tables show:

- *the number of families in each valley/village*
- *the number of families with various numbers of livestock*
- *the villages/valleys which have grazing.*

Hazarajat summary

District	Fam's	Sheep/goats					Cows					Grazing
		0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	
Yakawlang	2,526	293	96	479	981	592	427	913	709	354	115	8
Panjao	11,580	830	2,880	4,177	2,151	1,162	3,020	4,670	2,623	1,170	108	13
Waras	12,242	16	1,554	2,445	4,370	2,210	7,478	3,499	560	0	0	23
Lal	2,890	609	480	840	704	264	798	799	857	374	60	11
Dai Kundi	689	103	100	150	241	101	161	255	244	22	0	11
Sharistan	4,843											
Total	29,927	1,851	5,110	8,091	8,447	4,329	11,884	10,136	4,993	1,920	283	99565
Percent		6.2	17.1	27.0	28.2	14.5	39.7	33.9	16.7	6.4	0.9	

District: Yakawlang

Region and Village	Fam's	Sheep/goats					Cows					Grazing
		0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	
Qume Aba												
Sukhtagi	260	13	13	52	130	52	26	52	117	52	13	✓
Chel Borch	260	52	26	104	52	26	65	156	26	13	0	✓
Sachak	340	51	17	68	136	68	68	156	68	34	14	✓
Sabz Dara	475	57	9	47	261	100	71	95	190	95	24	✓
Kote sadat												
Band Amir	502	25	10	50	125	211	50	176	125	100	50	✓
Dara Ali	425	64	8	55	213	85	106	149	115	42	13	✓
Sari Bolaq	150	22	7	67	30	22	30	67	45	7	0	✓
Sia Dara												
Bakak	114	9	6	36	34	28	11	62	23	11	1	✓
Total	2,526	293	96	479	981	592	427	913	709	354	115	8
Percentage		12	4	19	39	23	17	36	28	14	5	100

District: Panjao

Village	Fam's	Sheep/goats					Cows					Grazing
		0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	
Tagabard	960	20	480	0	410	50	380	500		60	0	✓
Nargis	450	50	270	50	70	10	100	300	20	30	0	✓
Marka	1,140	100	300	200	70	90	250	350	490	45	5	?
Akhzarat	2,000	50	500	1,300	100	50	400	600	700	250	50	✓
Gandab	1,210	100	200	700	150	60	300	500	300	100	10	✓
Gudar	240	60	20	120	39	1	50	40	100	55	5	✓
Sagdis/Tar bulaq	1,800	50	100	400	550	700	600	800	200	180	20	✓
Miankawag	427	10	60	157	80	120	20	180	150	80	3	✓
Targai	540	40	200	250	49	1	180	200	80	80	0	✓
Tarapas	340	40	100	100	100	0	240	150	3	20	5	✓
Mohr	600	100	150	250	100	0	250	300	40	10	0	✓
Ghurghuri	820	110	300	200	200	10	10	250	350	110	10	✓
Naiqul	690	60	80	300	180	70	120	350	100	120	0	✓
Darazgul	363	40	120	150	53	0	120	150	90	30	0	✓
Totals	11,580	830	2,880	4,177	2,151	1,162	3,020	4,670	2,623	1,170	108	13
Percentage		7	25	36	19	10	26	40	23	10	0.9	93

District: Dai Kundi

Manteqa and Valley	Fam's	Sheep/goats					Cows					Grazing
		0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	
Baghal Qundo												
Tato	35	5	6	6	10	7	8	10	17	0	0	✓
Margha	30	5	5	5	12	3	2	10	18	0	0	✓
Gochan	96	20	25	20	25	6	25	40	31	0	0	✓
Mondah	96	10	8	30	40	7	25	45	25	1	0	✓
Ashtarlie												
Rangdarakht	77	18	10	20	17	12	22	20	30	5	0	✓
Chuwosh	40	0	3	10	15	2	5	20	15	0	0	✓
Chuwosh Sofly	61	6	10	10	20	16	15	20	20	6	0	✓
Raskaman	102	15	15	20	50	0	15	35	50	0	0	✓
New daraz	40	4	8	6	22	15	20	5	0	0	0	✓
Miansoflu	72	10	10	15	20	18	12	20	30	10	0	✓
Jingan												
Siarig	40	10	0	8	10	15	12	30	8	0	0	✓
Totals	689	103	100	150	241	101	161	255	244	22	0	11
Percentage		15	15	22	35	15	23	37	35	3	0	100

District: Waras

Valley	Fam's	Sheep/goats					Cows					Grazing
		0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	
Dola	246	12	37	50	98	49	172	69	5	0	0	✓
Gero-e-Sarab	226	11	34	45	91	45	162	59	5	0	0	✓
Sar-e Sarab	412	41	41	82	166	82	350	41	21	0	0	✓
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	403	20	81	60	162	80	323	60	20	0	0	✓
Sourkh Kawak	126	6	13	32	50	25	76	48	2	0	0	✓
Tagabghar	180	22	36	45	68	9	90	72	18	0	0	✓
Ligan	412	33	45	107	107	120	268	136	8	0	0	✓
Pajandor	228	23	23	46	114	22	46	171	11	0	0	✓
Sari Takht	924	46	46	185	277	370	462	416	46	0	0	×
Qulbatoo (Takht)	828	41	123	166	332	166	664	123	41	0	0	✓
Qumi ghaib Ali	260	15	28	70	99	48	169	86	5	0	0	✓
Chigin (Waras)	911	137	182	228	182	182	547	273	91	0	0	✓
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	224	18	25	63	81	47	146	74	40	0	0	✓
Tagab (Surk Joui)	700	182	70	175	259	14	448	238	14	0	0	✓
Qumi Barfi/ Qumi Khudi	450	23	54	117	162	95	283	162	5	0	0	✓
Qumi Mirza	339	27	30	92	119	71	200	132	7	0	0	✓
Qumi Yari	326	23	33	88	114	68	196	124	7	0	0	✓
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	1,046	52	157	209	419	209	838	188	21	0	0	✓
Binigaw/ Petab Joui	1,120	90	224	112	560	134	806	168	56	0	0	✓
Sultan Rubat/ Bastook	880	11	34	45	90	45	158	63	5	0	0	✓
Fato	240	19	67	65	82	7	142	94	5	0	0	✓
Petab Qul	244	24	25	24	122	49	122	115	7	0	0	✓
Shahi	502	40	75	75	251	60	201	201	100	0	0	✓
Qunuq/ Qra Ghjor	1,015	101	71	264	365	213	609	386	20	0	0	✓
Totals	12,242	1,017	1,554	2,445	4,370	2,210	7,478	3,499	560	0	0	23
Percentage		8	13	20	36	18	61	29	4.6	0	0	96

District: Lal

Manteqa and Village	Fam's	Sheep/goats					Cows					Graz-ing
		0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	0	1-2	3-5	5-10	10+	
Lal												
Qurabagha/Jawqul	177	30	40	70	30	7	50	60	40	27	0	×
Dahane Qulani	232	50	35	70	50	27	70	60	70	30	2	✓
Qalai Chaka	50	14	16	12	4	4	18	18	12	1	1	×
Saqaba	165	35	25	41	37	27	49	44	50	22	0	✓
Shakraki	105	20	25	35	15	10	25	40	30	10	0	✓
Petab Lal Miana	293	59	40	70	89	35	65	70	100	50	5	×
Dewalak	99	12	10	40	27	10	31	30	28	12	0	✓
Manju	125	25	30	40	25	10	30	40	20	30	5	✓
Naw Abad/Naw Agha	171	30	24	30	75	11	50	60	40	20	1	×
Petab Lal Markaz	165	26	15	65	50	9	30	40	60	25	10	×
Esar	129	20	20	30	50	9	41	25	35	28	0	✓
Qalacha	105	38	30	21	12	4	38	42	18	7	0	✓
Kirman												
Giroy	175	45	30	50	40	10	50	50	60	10	5	✓
Brishtogag	80	20	10	20	15	15	26	20	20	10	3	✓
Talkhak												
Shaknouka	59	20	10	10	15	4	25	20	10	4	0	×
Sarijangal												
Naw-e Takaghal	395	95	50	100	110	45	105	70	150	50	20	✓
Giroy Sarijangal	243	40	50	91	40	20	55	80	69	31	8	×
Shenya Chaperqul	122	30	20	45	20	7	40	30	45	7	0	✓
Totals	2,890	609	480	840	704	264	798	799	857	374	60	11
Percentages		21.1	16.6	29.1	24.4	9.1	27.6	27.6	29.7	12.9	2.1	61

District: Sharistan

Valley	Families nawa	Families vill.	Sheep/goats 0	Sheep/goats 1-2	Sheep/goats 3-5	Sheep/goats 5-10	Sheep/goats 10+	Cows 0	Cows 1-2	Cows 3-5	Cows 5-10	Cows 10+	Grazing
Norukhsai	230	65	23	38	4	0	0	42	23	0	0	0	1
Bardez	200	68	29	37	2	0	0	49	19	0	0	0	1
Hoowe	320	55	16	29	10	0	0	26	29	0	0	0	1
Denu	250	64	29	28	7	0	0	42	22	0	0	0	0
Eskan	539	123	20	57	39	7	0	32	78	3	0	0	1
Bogh	295	73	25	31	17	0	0	33	38	2	0	0	1
Bargee	590	89	23	45	11	0	0	48	41	0	0	0	1
Loe	150	52	24	20	8	0	0	37	15	0	0	0	1
Sangan	380	78	26	40	12	0	0	48	27	3	0	0	1
Tai Bargar	285	66	28	34	4	0	0	39	27	0	0	0	1
Mir Boi	140	108	48	32	33	5	0	57	46	6	0	0	1
Petab Sulfa	76	76	35	26	11	5	0	41	35	0	0	0	1
Petab Ulya	90	71	24	21	14	13	0	21	36	4	0	0	1
Kermak	85	40	15	17	9	9	0	25	22	3	0	0	1
Safed Choob	88	88	30	30	24	0	0	20	43	4	0	0	1
Gharghara Ulya	112	112	47	40	19	6	0	47	60	6	0	0	1
Nawar Katagak	115	100	29	47	38	0	0	36	53	5	0	0	1
Deh Balae Kalam	78	68	26	23	13	5	1	33	35	0	0	0	0
Nairiak Sulfa	63	53	20	20	13	0	0	36	26	0	0	0	1
Doost Bek	61	60	28	18	9	5	0	42	18	0	0	0	1
Safed Pusta Ulya	108	108	43	32	21	12	0	46	51	9	0	0	1
Sayah Qoolak	94	74	0	36	17	11	0	28	31	5	0	0	1
Mooshmai	79	79	33	27	17	2	0	35	44	0	0	0	1
Pai Faiz Abad	95	95	21	43	22	9	0	48	47	0	0	0	1
Kul	59	48	27	20	12	0	0	36	19	4	0	0	1
Zenjook	49	49	14	17	8	9	0	14	34	0	0	0	1
Zardsang	79	58	8	28	21	0	0	17	40	0	0	0	1
Patanak	59	39	15	12	7	3	0	29	10	0	0	0	1
Tatrang	36	25	12	11	2	0	0	13	11	0	0	0	1
Wleyat Ghooch	38	38	16	13	6	4	0	17	18	3	0	0	1
Totals	4,843	2,122	734	872	430	105	1	1,037	998	57	0	0	28
Percentages			35	41	20	5	0	49	47	3	0	0	93

Appendix J Orchards

These tables show:

- *the number of families in each valley/village*
- *the number of families with orchards in which they grow produce for family use or for sale*

Hazarajat summary

District	Families	Families with orchards	
		for family	for sale
Yakawlang	2,526	77	0
Panjao	11,580	45	0
Waras	12,242	12,242	230
Lal	2,890	0	0
Dai Kundi	689	0	0
Sharistan	4,843		
Total	29,927	12,364	230
Percent		41.3	0.8

District: Yakawlang

Region and village	Families	Families with orchards	
		for family	for sale
Qume Aba			
Sukhtagi	260	40	0
Chel Borch	260	0	0
Sachak	340	10	0
Sabz Dara	475	8	0
Kote Sadat			
Band Amir	502	5	0
Dara Ali	425	10	0
Sari Bolaq	150	1	0
Sia Dara			
Bakak	114	3	0
Totals	2,526	77	0
Percentages		3	0

District: Panjao

Village	Families	Families with orchards	
		for family	for sale
Tagabard	960	0	
Nargis	450	0	0
Marka	1,140	15	0
Akhzarat	2,000	0	
Gandab	1,210	10	0
Gudar	240	0	0
Sagdis/Tarbulaq	1,800	0	0
Miankawag	427	10	0
Targai	540	0	0
Tarapas	340	0	0
Mohr	600	0	0
Ghurghuri	820	0	0
Naiqul	690	10	0
Darazgul	363	0	0
Totals	11,580	45	0
Percentage		0.4	0

District: Dai Kundi

Manteqa and valley	Families	Families with orchards	
		for family	for sale
Baghal Qundo			
Tato	35	0	0
Margha	30	0	0
Gochan	96	0	0
Mondah	96	0	0
Ashtarlie			
Rangdarakht	77	0	0
Chuwosh	40	0	0
Chuwosh Sofly	61	0	0
Raskaman	102	0	0
New daraz	40	0	0
Miansoflu	72	0	0
Jingan			
Siarig	40	0	0
Totals	689	0	0
Percentages		0	0

> "20 years ago was completely secure, we had authority. Then, after the revolution, all the time there were conflicts between commanders; but it also created problems for ordinary people, it affected everything, the commanders were eating poor people's food, they were looting ...."

> "Before war personal security was very good, there was freedom of movement. Then with the factions came insecurity; now it is a little better, but still not secure."

In the years before the Taliban take-over of the area, there was a general low-level insecurity, mainly caused by fighting between the different factions of Hizb-i-Wahdat, sometimes extremely localised. Worst hit were those districts where there were two or more groups of similar strength. The insecurity affected agencies' ability to operate. For example, Oxfam had to evacuate its Panjao office twice in 1996 and retreat to Yakawlang (at that time dominated by Khalili and relatively secure) and in the same year it closed its Waras office (re-opened in 1998) after several years of finding it extremely difficult to work there because of poor security. As well as essentially local conflicts, the area was also affected by the alliances which factions made with parties to the wider struggle.

Interestingly, some of those interviewed felt that in some districts there had been a change in the local support for the fighting:

> "People are thinking maybe the fighting will stop soon; people now don't like fighting like they did 20 years ago, 10 years ago, or even 2 years ago. Panjao is the same but in Yakawlang, Bamiyan, Dai Kundi, even Lal, people still want to fight." (Interview in Waras.)

The Taliban take-over changed the pattern of insecurity. In September 1998 the Taliban capture of the area was generally experienced as outsiders taking control by force. Bamiyan, Yakawlang and Panjao all experienced fighting, including attacks on civilians, looting of agency equipment and vehicles. Many local people fled for the safety of the hills. This pattern shifted as the Taliban formed local alliances, with Waras and Panjao becoming relatively stable under an Akbari-Taliban alliance. Yakawlang, Lal and Bamiyan changed hands over the winter; Yakawlang and Bamiyan went back to Taliban in the spring, whilst Lal remained under Hizb-i-Wahdat control. The Taliban's re-capture of Bamiyan in May 1999 led to some of the worst of the recent violence, a lot of which appeared to be Tajik-Hazara violence with its roots in a history of bad relations between these groups. Violence was directed against both people (with reports of summary executions and of civilian men being taken captive) and property. Almost the entire population fled (see also the discussion of IDPs on page 11). Solidarites reported 17% of the houses totally destroyed and a further 12% suffering 50% damage. There was also a massive loss of livelihood, with cultivated land reduced from 31,703 jeribs in 1998 to only 12,067 in 1999, giving an estimated wheat yield of 3,105 tonnes as against an estimated requirement of 15,038 — a deficit of 11,933. The potato yield was estimated to be down from 7,076 tonnes in 1998 to 2,351 tonnes in 1999. The number of cows was reduced to 64% of former total, goats to 50% and sheep to 66%. Bamiyan town still has a substantial contingent of Taliban soldiers and many inhabitants have not returned and are afraid to return.

A further dimension of the security situation was the return of the Kuchis to parts of Hazarajat. In May 1999, several hundred armed Kuchis arrived in Panjao and started going to villages asking for 20 years payment on land and demanding food and fuel (though the 20 years demand seemed to be a starting point rather than an absolute). There were also reports of people being beaten. The situation provoked a negative response in other districts

District: Waras

Valley	Families	Families with orchards	
		for family	for sale
Dola	246	5	0
Gero-e-Sarab	226	0	0
Sar-e Sarab	412	0	0
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	403	0	0
Sourkh Kawak	126	0	0
Tagabghar	180	36	0
Ligan	412	41	0
Pajandor	228	11	4
Sari Takht	924	0	0
Qulbatoo (Takht)	828	16	0
Qumi ghaib Ali	260	0	0
Chigin (Waras)	911	0	0
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	224	0	0
Tagab (Surk Joui)	700	0	0
Qumi Barfi/ Qumi Khudi	450	0	0
Qumi Mirza	339	0	0
Qumi Yari	326	0	0
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	1,046	21	0
Binigaw/ Petab Joui	1,120	0	0
Sultan Rubat/ Bastook	880	27	0
Fato	240	0	0
Petab Qul	244	73	12
Shahi	502	0	0
Qunuq/ Qra Ghjor	1,015	0	0
Totals	12,242	230	16
Percentage		1.9	0.1

District: Lal

Manteqa and village	Families	Families with orchards	
		for family	for sale
Lal			
Qurabagha/Jawqul	177	0	0
Dahane Qulani	232	0	0
Qalai Chaka	50	0	0
Saqaba	165	0	0
Shakraki	105	0	0
Petab Lal Miana	293	0	0
Dewalak	99	0	0
Manju	125	0	0
Naw Abad/Naw Agha	171	0	0
Petab Lal Markaz	165	0	0
Esar	129	0	0
Qalacha	105	0	0
Kirman			
Giroy	175	0	0
Brishtogag	80	0	0
Talkhak			
Shaknouka	59	0	0
Sarijangal			
Naw-e Takaghal	395	0	0
Giroy Sarijangal	243	0	0
Shenya Chaperqul	122	0	0
Totals	2,890	0	0
Percentages		0	0

District: Sharistan

Valley	Families		Families with orchards	
	nawa	village	for family	for sale
Norukhsai	230	65	15	0
Bardez	200	68	23	2
Hoowe	320	55	6	1
Denu	250	64	5	5
Eskan	539	123	5	84
Bogh	295	73	9	52
Bargee	590	89	5	74
Loe	150	52	7	23
Sangan	380	78	0	59
Tai Bargar	285	66	19	0
Mir Boi	140	108	11	15
Petab Sulfa	76	76	0	0
Petab Ulya	90	71	0	0
Kermak	85	40	14	2
Safed Choob	88	88	3	0
Gharghara Ulya	112	112	9	0
Nawar Katagak	115	100	25	20
Deh Balae Kalam	78	68	18	0
Nairiak Sulfa	63	53	37	27
Doost Bek	61	60	16	7
Safed Pusta Ulya	108	108	0	0
Sayah Qoolak	94	74	8	10
Mooshmai	79	79	0	0
Pai Faiz Abad	95	95	0	0
Kul	59	48	19	10
Zenjook	49	49	19	23
Zardsang	79	58	29	12
Patanak	59	39	1	1
Tatrang	36	25	11	0
Wleyat Ghooch	38	38	13	0
Totals	4,843	2,122	327	427
Percentages			15	20

Appendix K: Baseline survey – Indicators of wealth and poverty

These tables show:

- *the number of families in each valley/village*
- *the percentages of families with debts and dependent on charity*
- *the labour rate in KAf/day*
- *the percentage of traders in the population*
- *the number of families with various indicators of wealth and poverty: no tea, no sugar, only one living room, clean water, sanitation.*

Hazarajat summary

District	Debts %	Charity %	Labour rate	% traders	% of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 room	clean water	sanit-ation
Yakawlang	6.0	4.9	50,000	2.3	5.7	98.3	79.9	68.1	11.1
Panjao	4.8	5.7		1.6	4.5	64	49.1	30.6	7.1
Dai Kundi	29.8	25.3	33,333	2.9	62.2	98.4	22.8	43.3	12.6
Waras	29.8	25.3	33,000	2.9	62.6	98.4	22.8	43.3	12.6
Lal	31.1	27.4	26,944	0.5	62.0	98.9	55.9	48.0	9.7
Sharistan	69.1	6.9		1.1	48.0	80.0	43.0	11.0	1.0

District: Yakawlang

Region and Village	Fam's	Debts %	Charity %	Labour rate	% traders	number of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 room	clean water	sanit-ation
Qume Aba										
Sukhtagi	260	39	13	50,000	10	13	255	185	260	130
Chel Borch	260	21	26	50,000	4	13	255	234	234	26
Sachak	340	10	10	50,000	10	17	333	315	170	17
Sabz Dara	475	9	20	50,000	10	24	470	380	427	9
Kote sadat										
Band Amir	502	25	25	50,000	4	50	492	452	477	15
Dara Ali	425	21	21	50,000	5	13	416	255	42	63
Sari Bolaq	150	15	7	50,000	12	7	149	120	7	15
Sia Dara										
Bakak	114	11	3	50,000	3	6	113	78	103	6
Totals	2,526	151	125		58	143	2,483	2,019	1,720	281
Percentages		6.0	4.9		2.3	5.7	98.3	79.9	68.1	11.1
Average				50,000						

District: Panjao

Village	Fam's	Debts %	Char'y %	Labour rate	% traders	number of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 room	clean water	sanitation
Tagabard	960	40	100	1/2 ser	10	240	770	770	480	100
Nargis	450	50	40	1/2 ser	25	100	300	300	50	50
Marka	1,140	80	110	1 ser	20	200	400	570	350	150
Akhzarat	2,000	50	10	40,000	15	60	1,200	800	200	40
Gandab	1,210	30	20	40,000	20	24	600	970	240	50
Gudar	240	10	30	40,000	6	10	140	140	50	2
Sagdis/Tarbulaq	1,800	150	80	70,000	42	360	1,600	540	720	180
Miankawag	427	8	5	40,000	6	85	170	105	85	8
Targai	540	0	50	1/2 ser	4	108	513	140	270	14
Tarapas	340	40	10	50,000	9	30	150	200	136	14
Mohr	600	50	70	25,000	4	50	200	200	300	20
Ghurghuri	820	30	100	20,000	10	200	750	510	250	50
Naiqul	690	0	12	40,000	5	200	400	276	345	140
Darazgul	363	18	20	40,000	4	36	220	163	72	0
Totals	11,580	556	657		180	516	7,413	5,684	3,548	818
Percentage		4.8	5.7		1.6	4.5	64.0	49.1	30.6	7.1
Average										

District: Dai Kundi

Manteqa and Valley	Fam's	Debts %	Chr'y %	Labour rate	% traders	number of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 room	clean water	sanitation
Baghal Qundo										
Tato	35	15	10	0	0	24	34	11	18	0
Margha	30	8	8	30,000	0	18	29	9	18	0
Gochan	96	30	25		1	56	95	40	48	10
Mondah	96	29	30	0	2	67	95	19	48	0
Ashtarlie										
Rangdarakht	77	18	18	30,000	1	47	76	15	15	22
Chuwosh	40	12	8	0	1	24	39	8	12	4
Chuwosh Sofly	61	20	20	0	7	30	60	9	18	12
Raskaman	102	25	15		3	70	101	20	51	10
New daraz	40	10	8		0	20	39	4	36	0
Miansoflu	72	13	12		5	43	71	10	14	29
Jingan										
Siarig	40	25	20	40,000	0	32	39	12	20	0
Totals	689	205	174	100,000	20	431	678	157	298	87
Percentages		29.8	25.3		2.9	62.6	98.4	22.8	43.3	12.6
Average				33,333						

District: Waras

Village	Fam's	Debts %	Chr'y %	Labour rate	% traders	number of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 room	clean water	sanit-ation
Dola	246	87	7	30,000	4	37	240	210	61	80
Gero-e-Sarab	226	90	9	35,000	10	45	204	192	68	91
Sar-e Sarab	412	144	20	25,000	3	123	370	390	165	120
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	403	121	201	28,000	3	121	363	363	161	111
Sourkh Kawak	126	?	5	0	10	25	113	113		70
Tagabghar	180	36	9	25,000	7	36	170	108		120
Ligan	412	128	16	29,000	8	100	370	330	120	80
Pajandor	228	68	4	28,000	3	137	217	180	45	34
Sari Takht	924	370	28	35,000	10	92	880	277	647	739
Qulbatoo (Takht)	828	414	41	28,000	5	248	787	787	331	605
Qumi ghaib Ali	260	117	18	28,000	4	52	221	234	52	70
Chigin (Waras)	911	273	27	25,000	36	180	728	80	182	410
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	224	67	9	28,000	11	63	202	179	134	45
Tagab (Surk Joui)	700	210	42	30,000	28	280	686	630	490	210
Qumi Barfi/Qumi Khudi	450	148	22	25,000	22	135	441	405	135	157
Qumi Mirza	339	102	17	28,000	10	100	300	300	135	160
Qumi Yari	326	98	20	30,000	4	81	319	309	163	130
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	1,046	419	31	30,000	3	209	942	942	214	140
Binigaw/Petab Joui	1,120	448	56	30,000	3	112	1,008	896	336	63
Sultan Rubat/Bastook	226	86	5	28,000	3	34	203	203	113	45
Fato	240	48	12	25,000	7	60	216	192	96	216
Petab Qul	244	49	10	25,000	10	60	220	219	146	98
Shahi	503	176	25	25,000	10	50	497	402	201	150
Qunuq/ Qra Ghjor	1,015	305	30	25,000	45	507	1,005	913	305	203
Totals	11,589	3,562	664	645,000	259	2,887	10,702	8,854	4,300	4,147
Percentage		30.7	5.7		2.2	24.9	92.3	76.4	37.1	35.8
Average				28,043						

District: Lal

Manteqa and Village	Fam's	Debts %	Chr'y %	Labour rate	% traders	number of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 room	clean water	sanit-ation
Lal										
Qurabagha/Jawqul	177	60	65	25,000	6	53	175	106	71	17
Dahane Qulani	232	10	70	25,000	60	139	230	139	185	12
Qalai Chaka	50	40	14	25,000	1	30	49	49	5	0
Saqaba	165	46	47	25,000	10	99	165	66	99	16
Shakraki	105	50	40	25,000	2	62	104	62	53	10
Petab Lal Miana	293	176	60	25,000	3	190	287	132	234	88
Dewalak	99	30	30	25,000	2	70	98	60	70	10
Manju	125	38	35	30,000	2	87	124	87	37	2
Naw Abad/Naw Agha	171	41	37	30,000	12	110	168	68	120	17
Petab Lal Markaz	165	34	30	30,000	5	99	157	66	33	16
Esar	129	35	36	25,000	3	90	128	65	90	7
Qalacha	105	69	42	20,000	1	49	103	78	16	2
Kirman										
Giroy	175	65	60	30,000	2	140	175	140	87	5
Brishtogag	80	20	25	30,000	2	56	80	64	40	4
Talkhak										
Shaknouka	59	20	20	25,000		47	59	41	12	0
Sarijangal										
Naw-e Takaghal	395	95	120	30,000	9	276	395	198	158	39
Giroy Sarijangal	243	38	32	30,000	6	170	240	122	72	24
Shenya Chaperqul	122	32	28	30,000	0	25	121	73	6	12
Totals	2,890	899	791	485,000	15	1,792	2,858	1,616	1,388	281
Percentage		31.1	27.4		0.5	62.0	98.9	55.9	48.0	9.7
Average				26,944						

District: Sharistan

Valley	Families: nawa	Families: vill.	Debt %	Chr'y %	Lab. rate	% traders	number of families with: no tea	no sugar	only 1 room	clean water	sanitation
Norukhsai	230	65	65	0	0	0	100	maj	50	20	0
Bardez	200	68	68	0	0	0	185	maj	53	9	0
Hoowe	320	55	55	0	0	3	190	maj	45	8	0
Denu	250	64	64	0	0	2	150	maj	50	30	0
Eskan	539	123	123	0	0	4	200	maj	200	95	10
Bogh	295	73	73	0	0	3	153	maj	80	96	0
Bargee	590	89	89	0	0	3	107	maj	80	95	0
Loe	150	52	52	0	0	0	45	maj	30	5	0
Sangan	380	78	78	0	0	2	250	maj	63	70	0
Tai Bargar	285	66	66	0	0	0	146	maj	47	12	0
Mir Boi	140	108	81	12	0	2	71	108	108	0	10
Petab Sulfa	76	76	47	7	0	0	46	76	76	0	1
Petab Ulya	90	71	43	6	0	0	49	71	84	20	1
Kermak	85	40	21	6	75,000	1	34	50	85	0	0
Safed Choob	88	88	56	8	0	0	71	84	88	20	0
Gharghara Ulya	112	112	55	10	75,000	2	60	112	112	20	8
Nawar Katagak	115	100	62	4	0	1	67	113	114	0	3
Deh Balae Kalam	78	68	38	5	0	0	43	68	78	1	0
Nairiak Sulfa	63	53	26	6	0	1	43	62	63	0	1
Doost Bek	61	60	0	0	0	0	37	60	60	0	2
Safed Pusta Ulya	108	108	80	6	0	0	-	-	0	10	4
Sayah Qoolak	94	74	20	30	0	6	53	64	64	0	1
Mooshmai	79	79	48	8	75,000	3	40	76	79	0	2
Pai Faiz Abad	95	95	41	6	0	1	50	84	80	2	5
Kul	59	48	24	5	0	3	33	54	48	6	3
Zenjook	49	49	17	6	75,000	4	15	47	49	1	0
Zardsang	79	58	29	8	75,000	8	33	49	79	0	0
Patanak	59	39	16	5	0	0	17	39	59	0	0
Tatrang	36	25	13	3	0	0	16	25	36	0	0
Wleyat Ghooch	38	38	16	6	0	3	19	34	38	0	2
Totals	4,843	2,122	1,466	147		52	2,323	1,276	2,098	520	53
Percentages[64]			69.1	6.9		1.1	48	80	43	11	1

§ Key: maj = majority

[64] some figures relate to nawa and some to village

Appendix L: Baseline survey – Population movement and remittances

These tables show:

- *the number of families in each village/valley*
- *the number whole families which have left the area*
- *the number of families which have a family member out of the area*
- *the number of families receiving remittances*
- *the number of IDP families which have arrived in the last year*

Hazarajat summary

District	Families	% leaving area		% with family member out		% receiving remittances
		last 2 years	this year	last 2 years	this year	
Yakawlang	2,526	5.9	4.5	15.2	20.8	2.5
Dai Kundi	689	18.4	3.0	26.6	11.5	32.2
Panjao	11,580	11.4	5.8	2.2	4.1	9.4
Waras	12,242	18.4	3.0	26.6	11.5	32.2
Lal	2,890	7.2	4.9	0.7	0.6	6.2
Sharistan	4,843	12.2	10.8	48.3	34.9	23.0

District: Yakawlang

Region and village	Families	% leaving area		% family member out		% remit-tances
		last 2 yrs	this yr	last 2 yrs	this yr	
Qume Aba						
Sukhtagi	260	15	10	40	30	5
Chel Borch	260	20	26	25	60	13
Sachak	340	60	30	40	70	24
Sabz Dara	475	12	8	60	70	5
Kote sadat						
Band Amir	502	10	10	40	55	10
Dara Ali	425	16	12	130	200	4
Sari Bolaq	150	8	10	30	20	0
Sia Dara						
Bakak	114	7	8	19	20	2
Totals	2,526	148	114	384	525	63
Percentages		5.9	4.5	15.2	20.8	2.5

District: Panjao

Valley	Families	% leaving area		% family member out		IDPs in last yr	% remit-tances
		last 2 yrs	this yr	last 2 yrs	this yr		
Tagabarg	960	100	50	30	25		100
Nargis	450	50	50	20	15		60
Marka	1,140	120	30	120	80		200
Akhzarat	2,000	250	100	90	60		200
Gandab	1,210	300	200	40	35		200
Gudar	240	50	18	20	19		20
Sagdis/Tarbulaq	1,800	200	120	300	90	20	0
Miankawag	427	12	6	9	10	4	14
Targai	540	30	10	40	30		60
Tarapas	340	60	0	30	25		10
Mohr	600	60	14	70	20		60
Ghurghuri	820	60	50	40	25		150
Naiqul	690	20	10	50	20		12
Darazgul	363	10	12	20	15		6
Totals	11,580	1,322	670	259	469	24	1,092
Percentage		11.4	5.8	2.2	4.1		9.4

District: Dai Kundi

Valley	Families	% leaving area		% family member out		IDPs in last yr	% remit-tances
		last 2 yrs	this yr	last 2 yrs	this yr		
Baghal Qundo							
Tato	35			8	3	0	8
Margha	30	0	0	2	0	0	6
Gochan	96	15	5	25	11	0	30
Mondah	96	6	0	8	5	0	20
Ashtarlie							
Rangdarakht	77	11	0	13	5	0	15
Chuwosh	40	10	0	15	6	0	20
Chuwosh Sofly	61	30	0	40	5	0	35
Raskaman	102	13	8	40	20	0	40
New daraz	40	2	0	2	5	2	3
Miansoflu	72	10	0	10	9	0	25
Jingan							
Siarig	40	30	8	20	10	0	20
Totals	689	127	21	183	79	2	222
Percentages		18.4	3.0	26.6	11.5	0.3	32.2

and the Taliban authorities took high-level action to resolve the situation. The Kuchis finally left the area on June 17th, but most Hazaras think that this is not the end of the story and that the Kuchis will return again in 2000.

At the time of the Kuchi arrival an Oxfam/WFP food distribution was under way. The situation was initially very tense, but a decision was taken to continue work for fear that a withdrawal might increase fears and precipitate flight to the mountains (the weather was still very cold and displacement to the hills would have brought certain suffering and possible death). Pashtun senior staff in both organisations were key to negotiating the security of supplies and staff and to allowing the operation to be completed without any loss of wheat or any major security incident. The presence of expats in the area may also have helped to allay local fears and to have curbed tendencies to looting or other violent acts.

Legitimacy and changing patterns of power and influence

As with security, in discussing issues of legitimacy with many Hazaras there is a sense of going back to an idealised past, though it is unclear how far this is due to an innate conservatism and how much due to the failure of recent political changes. As in most societies legitimacy is viewed differently by different people, yet there is an overwhelming sense that the political structures in place, not just today but also in the more recent past, totally lack legitimacy in the eyes of most of the population. The gun is seen to rule; the term 'faction' is used rather than 'party' — and factions are associated with guns, not with politics. There were comments such as:

> *"The old [pre revolution] style was seen as legitimate, a poor Sayyed could get through to parliament. People hated the old Hizb-i-Wahdat leaders." (Yakawlang)*
>
> *"20 years ago the leadership was traditional arbabs, mirs and Sayyeds; everyone knew who was leader. Then we saw a change of leadership at communist time, traditional leaders were imprisoned, we saw the setting up of various organisations — farmers' organisations, etc."*
>
> *"People want to go back to traditional [pre revolution] leadership; they believe factions have done nothing for them, but many of traditional leaders have gone. People feel that no one has heard their voice in last 20 years, though the uluswal in Waras is more open minded than most." (Waras)*
>
> *"Before, those who had land and those who were elders had power, now those who have guns are powerful."*

Almost everyone spoke of being unhappy with commanders. Sometimes they looked back to the landlords, saying, 'God gives land. Sometimes they looked for a new leadership.

Yet although they wanted a new leadership, people also spoke of their lack of hope that it would emerge from within community. They pinned their hopes instead on the idea that it might come from outside. Some even spoke of religious belief becoming weak compared to 20 years ago because, 'deeds don't match words'. The comment that there was no way for ordinary people to be heard was made on many occasions.

District: Waras

Valley	Families	% leaving area		% family member out		IDPs in last yr	% remit-tances
		last 2 yrs	this yr	last 2 yrs	this yr		
Dola	246	10	0	20	10	0	61
Gero-e-Sarab	226	12	0	21	12	0	45
Sar-e Sarab	412	10	0	60	20	0	82
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	403	20	0	50	10	7	60
Sourkh Kawak	126	15	0	10	2	0	25
Tagabghar	180	16	0	20	5	0	8
Ligan	412	20	5	30	5	0	41
Pajandor	228	30	10	25	3	0	11
Sari Takht	924	46	46	85	40	0	46
Qulbatoo (Takht)	828	20	0	90	31	60	207
Qumi ghaib Ali	260	10	0	26	11	0	60
Chigin (Waras)	911	12	27	31	8	42	73
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	224	10	10	60	15	10	18
Tagab (Surk Joui)	700	12	0	91	3	0	56
Qumi Barfi/Qumi Khudi	450	10	0	10	3	14	27
Qumi Mirza	339	15	0	41	15	0	15
Qumi Yari	326	15	0	42	11	0	23
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	1,046	8	0	101	15	0	214
Binigaw/Petab Joui	1,120	20	0	98	50	40	224
Sultan Rubat/Bastook	226	7	0	43	11	0	11
Fato	240	15	0	31	15	0	19
Petab Qul	244	20	10	41	16	0	24
Shahi	503	40	20	71	32	0	15
Qunuq/ Qra Ghjor	1,015	40	22	91	45	0	81
Totals	11,589	433	150	1,188	388	173	1,446
Percentage		3.7	1.3	10.3	3.3	1.5	12.5

District: Lal

Valley	Families	% leaving area		% family member out		IDPs in last yr	% remit-tances
		last 2 yrs	this yr	last 2 yrs	this yr		
Lal							
Qurabagha/Jawqul	177	9	5	4	0	2	11
Dahane Qulani	232	17	10	0	0	0	20
Qalai Chaka	50	2	8	2	3	0	2
Saqaba	165	32	15	6	3	0	18
Shakraki	105	5	3	3	0	2	10
Petab Lal Miana	293	15	6	15	6	4	15
Dewalak	99	8	5			0	6
Manju	125	12	6	2	0	0	10
Naw Abad/Naw Agha	171	17	4	3	2	3	12
Petab Lal Markaz	165	8	6	0	0	2	8
Esar	129	6	8	0	0	0	8
Qalacha	105	11	18	2	1	0	8
Kirman							
Giroy	175	6	8	0	2	10	4
Brishtogag	80	4	10	1	2	0	5
Talkhak							
Shaknouka	59	7	6	3	2	4	3
Sarijangal							
Naw-e Takaghal	395	30	15	5	4	0	22
Giroy Sarijangal	243	10	6	0	2	0	12
Shenya Chaperqul	122	8	2	4	1	0	6
Totals	2,890	207	141	20	16	27	180
Percentage		7.2	4.9	0.7	0.6	0.9	6.2

District: Sharistan

Valley	Families		% leaving area		% family member out		IDPs in last yr	% remit-tances
	nawa	village	last 2 yrs	this yr	last 2 yrs	this yr		
Norukhsai	230	65	15	150	130	30	0	110
Bardez	200	68	105	60	170	180	0	185
Hoowe	320	55	60	45	150	200	0	150
Denu	250	64	41	40	190	200	0	143
Eskan	539	123	30	25	200	300	0	190
Bogh	295	73	36	32	197	200	0	89
Bargee	590	89	15	15	50	45	0	40
Loe	150	52	25	20	90	85	0	35
Sangan	380	78	50	32	90	100	0	63
Tai Bargar	285	66	50	36	150	132	0	108
Mir Boi	140	108	8	2	90	25	0	0
Petab Sulfa	76	76	7	3	42	8	0	0
Petab Ulya	90	71	10	4	80	20	0	0
Kermak	85	40	3	4	30	6	0	0
Safed Choob	88	88	6	2	40	10	0	0
Gharghara Ulya	112	112	0	3	70	20	0	0
Nawar Katagak	115	100	10	6	60	30	0	0
Deh Balae Kalam	78	68	10	6	50	15	1	0
Nairiak Sulfa	63	53	6	2	18	6	0	0
Doost Bek	61	60	7	6	25	5	0	0
Safed Pusta Ulya	108	108	25	0	100	8	0	0
Sayah Qoolak	94	74	5	1	50	12	0	0
Mooshmai	79	79	8	3	35	15	0	0
Pai Faiz Abad	95	95	10	7	60	6	0	0
Kul	59	48	8	3	21	5	0	0
Zenjook	49	49	5	7	50	6	0	0
Zardsang	79	58	20	3	15	6	0	0
Patanak	59	39	10	3	40	10	0	0
Tatrang	36	25	0	0	20	3	0	0
Wleyat Ghooch	38	38	7	3	25	4	0	0
Totals	4,843	2,122	592	523	2,338	1,692	1	1,113
Percentage			12.2	10.8	48.3	34.9		23.0

Appendix M: Baseline survey – Environment

These tables show:

- *the number of families in villages/valleys*
- *the villages/valleys with increased flooding in the last 2 years, with increased trees planted and with increased planting of rainfed alfalfa*
- *the villages/valleys in which flood protection work has been undertaken*
- *the villages/valleys with an NGO presence*
- *the average number of days families are reported to spend collecting fuel each year*
- *the numbers of families owning, 0, 1–10 and more than 10 trees.*

Hazarajat summary

District	Families	% valleys with increased			% valleys with		Days to collect fuel
		floods	trees	alfalfa	flood protection	NGO work	
Yakawlang	2,526	62.5	50	0	25	75	64
Panjao	11,580	100	100	21	21	100	45
Dai Kundi	689	100	64	0	0	0	39
Lal	2,890	100	89	83	39	94	46
Sharistan	4,843	43	60	0	0	0	21

District: Yakawlang

Region and village	Families	Villages with increased:			Villages with:		Days to collect fuel
		floods	trees	alfalfa	flood protect.	NGOs	
Qume Aba							
Sukhtagi	260	1	1	0	0	0	60
Chel Borch	260	0	0	0	1	1	60
Sachak	340	1	1	0	1	1	60
Sabz Dara	475	1	0	0	0	1	60
Kote sadat							
Band Amir	502	1	0	0	0	1	70
Dara Ali	425	0	1	0	0	1	70
Sari Bolaq	150	1	0	0	0	1	70
Sia Dara							
Bakak	114	0	1	0	0	0	60
Totals	2,526	5	4	0	2	6	510
Percentages		62.5	50	0	25	75	
Average							64

District: Panjao

Valley	Families	Valleys with increased:			Valleys with:		Days to collect fuel
		floods	trees	alfalfa	flood protect.	NGOs	
Tagabarg	960	1	1	1	0	1	30
Nargis	450	1	1	0	0	1	60
Marka	1,140	1	1	0	0	1	
Akhzarat	2,000	1	1	1	0	1	20
Gandab	1,210	1	1	1	0	1	20
Gudar	240	1	1	0	0	1	60
Sagdis/ Tarbalaq	1,800	1	1	0	1	1	60
Miankawag	427	1	1	0	0	1	30
Targai	540	1	1	0	0	1	60
Tarapas	340	1	1	0	1	1	30
Mohr	600	1	1	0	1	1	75
Ghurghuri	820	1	1	0	0	1	60
Naiqul	690	1	1	0	0	1	
Darazgul	363	1	1	0	0	1	40
Totals	11,580	14	14	3	3	14	545
Percentage		100	100	21	21	100	
Average							45

District: Dai Kundi

Manteqa and valley	Fam's	Valleys with increased: floods	trees	alfalfa	Valleys with: flood protect	NGOs	Days to collect fuel
Baghal Qundo							
Tato	35	1	1	0	0	0	30
Margha	30	1	1	0	0	0	30
Gochan	96	1	1	0	0	0	30
Mondah	96	1	1	0	0	0	
Ashtarlie							
Rangdarakht	77	1	1	0	0	0	50
Chuwosh	40	1	1	0	0	0	
Chuwosh Sofly	61	1		0	0	0	45
Raskaman	102	1		0	0	0	50
New daraz	40	1		0	0	0	45
Miansoflu	72	1	1	0	0	0	30
Jingan							
Siarig	40	1		0	0	0	45
Total	689	11	7	0	0	0	355
Percentage		100	64	0	0	0	
Average							39

District: Waras

Valley	Fam's	Valleys with increased:			Valleys with:		Days to collect fuel
		floods	trees	alfalfa	flood protect	NGOs	
Dola	246	1	0	0	0	1	30
Gero-e-Sarab	226	1	0	0	0	1	35
Sar-e Sarab	412	1	0	0	0	1	30
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	403	1	0	0	0	0	30
Sourkh Kawak	126	1	0	0	0	1	30
Tagabghar	180	1	0	0	0	1	30
Ligan	412	1	0	0	0	1	20
Pajandor	228	1	1	1	1	1	20
Sari Takht	924	1	1	0	0	1	52
Qulbatoo (Takht)	828	1	0	0	0	1	20
Qumi ghaib Ali	260	1	0	0	0	1	30
Chigin (Waras)	911	1	0	0	0	1	50
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	224	1	0	0	0	1	30
Tagab (Surk Joui)	700	1	0	0	0	1	30
Qumi Barfi/ Qumi Khudi	450	1	0	0	0	1	30
Qumi Mirza	339	1	0	0	0	1	30
Qumi Yari	326	1	0	0	0	1	30
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	1,046	1	0	0	0	0	25
Binigaw/ Petab Joui	1,120	1	0	0	1	1	30
Sultan Rubat/ Bastook	880	1	0	0	0	1	25
Fato	240	1	0	0	0	1	30
Petab Qul	244	1	0	0	0	1	30
Shahi	502	1		0	0	1	30
Qunuq/ Qra Ghjor	1,015	1	1	1	1	1	40
Totals	12,242	24	3	2	3	22	737
Percentages		100	0.1	0.1	0.1	92	
Average							30.7

District: Lal

Manteqa and village	Fam's	Villages with increased:			Villages with:		Days to collect fuel
		floods	trees	alfalfa	flood protect	NGOs	
Lal							
Qurabagha/Jawqul	177	1	1	1	0	1	45
Dahane Qulani	232	1	1	1	1	1	50
Qalai Chaka	50	1	1	1	0	1	45
Saqaba	165	1	1	1	0	1	45
Shakraki	105	1	1	1	1	1	45
Petab Lal Miana	293	1	1	1	1	1	45
Dewalak	99	1	1	1	1	1	45
Manju	125	1	1	1	0	1	45
Naw Abad/Naw Agha	171	1	1	1	1	1	45
Petab Lal Markaz	165	1	1	1	1	1	0
Esar	129	1	1	1	0	1	50
Qalacha	105	1	1	1	0	1	45
Kirman							
Giroy	175	1	0	0	0	1	40
Brishtogag	80	1	0	0	0	0	40
Talkhak							
Shaknouka	59	1	1	0	1	1	45
Sarijangal							
Naw-e Takaghal	395	1	1	1	0	1	60
Giroy Sarijangal	243	1	1	1	0	1	45
Shenya Chaperqul	122	1	1	1	0	1	45
Totals	2,890	18	16	15	7	17	780
Percentages		100	89	83	39	94	
Average							46

District: Sharistan

Village	Families		Valleys with increased:			Valleys with:		Days to collect fuel
	nawa	vill.	floods	trees	alfalfa	flood protect	NGOs	
Norukhsai	230	65	0	0	0	0	0	45
Bardez	200	68	0	0	0	0	0	48
Hoowe	320	55	0	0	0	0	0	60
Denu	250	64	0	0	0	0	0	–
Eskan	539	123	0	0	0	0	0	45
Bogh	295	73	0	0	0	0	0	–
Bargee	590	89	0	0	0	0	0	–
Loe	150	52	0	0	0	0	0	66
Sangan	380	78	0	0	0	0	0	–
Tai Bargar	285	66	0	0	0	0	0	69
Mir Boi	140	108	0	1	0	0	0	30
Petab Sulfa	76	76	1	1	0	0	0	33
Petab Ulya	90	71	1	0	0	0	0	36
Kermak	85	40	1	1	0	0	0	36
Safed Choob	88	88	1	0	0	0	0	20
Gharghara Ulya	112	112	1	1	0	0	0	20
Nawar Katagak	115	100	0	1	0	0	0	26
Deh Balae Kalam	78	68	1	1	0	0	0	24
Nairiak Sulfa	63	53	1	1	0	0	0	10
Doost Bek	61	60	1	1	0	0	0	24
Safed Pusta Ulya	108	108	1	1	0	0	0	20
Sayah Qoolak	94	74	1	1	0	0	0	20
Mooshmai	79	79	1	1	0	0	0	30
Pai Faiz Abad	95	95	0	1	0	0	0	45
Kul	59	48	1	1	0	0	0	9
Zenjook	49	49	0	1	0	0	0	20
Zardsang	79	58	1	1	0	0	0	4
Patanak	59	39	0	1	0	0	0	45
Tatrang	36	25	0	1	0	0	0	10
Wleyat Ghooch	38	38	0	1	0	0	0	18
Totals	4,843	2,122	13	18	0	0	0	549
Percentages			43.3	60	0	0	0	
Average								21

Appendix N: Baseline survey - Health facilities

These tables show:

- *the numbers of families in villages/valleys*
- *the numbers of trained local midwives in each valley/village*
- *the percentage of valleys/villages which have at least one trained local midwife*
- *the numbers of valleys/villages which have had an eye clinic in the last three years.*

Hazarajat summary

District	% of valleys with midwife	% of valleys had eye clinic
Yakawlang	12.5	0
Panjao	42.9	0
Dai Kundi	0.0	0
Waras	4.2	0
Lal	38.9	67
Sharistan	47.0	0

District: Yakawlang

Region	Village	Families	Midwife	Eye clinic
Qume Aba	Sukhtagi	260	0	0
	Chel Borch	260	0	0
	Sachak	340	0	0
	Sabz Dara	475	0	0
Kote sadat	Band Amir	502	0	0
	Dara Ali	425	0	0
	Sari Bolaq	150	1	0
Sia Dara	Bakak	114	0	0
Totals		2,526	1	0
Percentage			13	0

At the very local village level, however, leadership was seen, at least sometimes, as still being legitimate.

Surprisingly to the author, as she remembers (as a worker in the area) the fear in which the Taliban were held prior to their arrival, a number of those interviewed reported that many people found the current regime more legitimate than the previous one:

> *"Legitimacy? It's difficult to say, some think illegitimate but most people are more happy than previous years because security is better."*

> *"Those involved in groups are unhappy, others are happy with the changes."*

Mainly this was because legitimacy was seen as bound up with peace — or at least peace made a ruling authority acceptable, even if not legitimate:

> *"Everyone likes peace, they don't like the factions. The Taliban? Maybe OK if no more fighting."*

The lack of legitimacy is compounded by the fact that 20 years of war has meant that little is left by way of a functioning bureaucracy in any of the districts in Hazarajat and the authorities are seen as providing nothing and merely being extractive.

Social relations

Hazarajat is the most mono-ethnic area in Afghanistan. It is overwhelmingly Shia Imami Muslim, though there are some Ismaeli Shia and some Sunni Hazaras. Bamiyan is the most mixed area with 67% Hazara, 15% Tajik, 14% Sayyed, and just under 2% Pashtun and 2% Quizilabash.[6] There are small numbers of other groups in some of the other districts, mostly traders.

In general there seems to have been an increase in tensions between ethnic groups over last 20 years which cannot be separated from politics. People referred to a history of bad relations between Tajiks and Hazaras going back to the time of Abdul Raman Khan:

> *"Whenever they had the chance they did bad things to Hazaras, and Hazaras did bad things to Tajiks."*

The 1993 Afshar massacre in west Kabul, which saw the killing of hundreds of Hazara residents by Massoud's forces, left a legacy with Hazara people and fuels ethno-religious conflict. It also brought about an alliance of Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami and Hizb-i-Wahdat against Tajiks, seen as the common enemy. Massoud was blamed by many for the recent fighting in Bamiyan:

> *"Massoud told Mohaqqeq [Hizb-i-Wahdat] that if he attacked Bamiyan, Massoud would attack Kabul. But he didn't."*

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[6] Solidarites, 1999 - report unpublished at time of writing

District: Panjao

Valley	Families	Midwife	Eye clinic
Tagabarg	960	1	0
Nargis	450	1	0
Marka	1,140	1	0
Akhzarat	2,000	0	0
Gandab	1,210	1	0
Gudar	240	1	0
Sagdis/Tarbulaq	1,800	0	0
Miankawag	427	0	0
Targai	540	0	0
Tarapas	340	0	0
Mohr	600	0	0
Ghurghuri	820	1	0
Naiqul	690	0	0
Darazgul	363	0	0
Totals	11,580	6	0
Percentages		43	0

District: Dai Kundi

Manteqa	Valley	Families	Midwife	Eye clinic
Baghal Qundo	Tato	35	0	0
	Margha	30	0	0
	Gochan	96	0	0
	Mondah	96	0	0
Ashtarlie	Rangdarakht	77	0	0
	Chuwosh	40	0	0
	Chuwosh Sofly	61	0	0
	Raskaman	102	0	0
	New daraz	40	0	0
	Miansoflu	72	0	0
Jingan	Siarig	40	0	0
Total		689	0	0
Percentage			0	0

District: Waras

Valley	Families	Midwife	Eye clinic
Dola	246	0	0
Gero-e-Sarab	226	0	0
Sar-e Sarab	412	0	0
Qumi Sultan (Surk Joui)	403	0	0
Sourkh Kawak	126	0	0
Tagabghar	180	0	0
Ligan	412	0	0
Pajandor	228	0	0
Sari Takht	924	1	0
Qulbatoo (Takht)	828	0	0
Qumi ghaib Ali	260	0	0
Chigin (Waras)	911	0	0
Sial Borda (Surk Joui)	224	0	0
Tagab (Surk Joui)	700	0	0
Qumi Barfi/Qumi Khudi	450	0	0
Qumi Mirza	339	0	0
Qumi Yari	326	0	0
Safid Ghaw e Sulfa	1,046	0	0
Binigaw/Petab Joui	1,120	0	0
Sultan Rubat/Bastook	880	0	0
Fato	240	0	0
Petab Qul	244	0	0
Shahi	502	0	0
Qunuq/Qra Ghjor/Quf Qul	1,015	0	0
Totals	12,242	1	0
Percentages		4	0

District: Lal

Manteqa	Village	Families	Midwife	Eye clinic
Lal	Qurabagha/Jawqul	177	0	0
	Dahane Qulani	232	1	1
	Qalai Chaka	50	0	1
	Saqaba	165	1	1
	Shakraki	105	1	1
	Petab Lal Miana	293	1	1
	Dewalak	99	1	0
	Manju	125	0	1
	Naw Abad/Naw Agha	171	0	1
	Petab Lal Markaz	165	1	1
	Esar	129	1	1
	Qalacha	105	0	1
Kirman	Giroy	175	0	0
	Brishtogag	80	0	0
Talkhak	Shaknouka	59	0	0
Sarijangal	Naw-e Takaghal	395	0	0
	Giroy Sarijangal	243	0	1
	Shenya Chaperqul	122	0	1
Totals		2,890	7	12
Percentages			39	67

District: Sharistan

Valley	Families nawa	Families village	Midwife	Eye clinic
Norukhsai	230		0	0
Bardez	200	68	0	0
Hoowe	320	55	0	0
Denu	250	64	0	0
Eskan	539	123	0	0
Bogh	295	73	0	0
Bargee	590	89	0	0
Loe	150	52	0	0
Sangan	380	78	0	0
Tai Bargar	285	66	0	0
Mir Boi	140	108	2	0
Petab Sulfa	76	76	2	0
Petab Ulya	90	71	5	0
Kermak	85	40	3	0
Safed Choob	88	88	3	0
Gharghara Ulya	112	112	2	0
Nawar Katagak	115	100	2	0
Deh Balae Kalam	78	68	0	0
Nairiak Sulfa	63	53	0	0
Doost Bek	61	60	2	0
Safed Pusta Ulya	108	108	1	0
Sayah Qoolak	94	74	2	0
Mooshmai	79	79	2	0
Pai Faiz Abad	95	95	2	0
Kul	59	48	2	0
Zenjook	49	49	0	0
Zardsang	79	58	3	0
Patanak	59	39	0	0
Tatrang	36	25	0	0
Wleyat Ghooch	38	38	0	0
Totals	4,843	2,057	33	0
Percentages			47	0

Appendix O: Baseline survey – Hospitals and clinics

District: Lal

Valley	Clinics/hospitals	
	now	before war
Jawqul	0	0
Safid chashma	0	0
Qulani	0	0
Gerou Lal Payan	0	0
Petab Lal Payan	0	0
Saqaba	0	0
Shakraki	0	0
Petab Lal Miana	3	1
Nawi Aghan	0	0
Dewalak	0	0
Kirman	0	0
Talkhak	0	0
Sarjangal Payan	0	0
Sarjangal Miana	1	0
Sarjangal Bala	0	0
Totals	4	1

District: Panjao

Valley	School level Clinics/hospitals	
	now	before war
Tagabbarg	0	0
Nurgis	3	1
Morka	0	0
Akhzarat	0	0
Gandab	0	0
Goder	0	0
Sagdis	0	0
Miankawak	0	0
Targhai	0	0
Tarapas	0	0
Mohr	0	0
Ghur Ghury	0	0
Turbulaq	0	0
Kerman	0	0
Naiqul	0	0
Darazqul	0	0
Totals	3	1

District: Waras

Valley	Clinics/hospitals	
	now	before war
Dola, Tagabsha	0	0
Gero-e-Sarab	0	0
Sari Sarab+Petab Parab	0	0
Qumi Sultan (surk joui)	0	0
Soukh Kawak + Tagabghar	1	0
Ligan + Pazahndor	0	0
Plan Naspato	0	0
Sari Tkhat	1	0
Qulbatoo(Takht)	0	0
Chigin (Waras)	0	0
Sial borda (sorkh joi)	0	0
Galqul (sorkh joi)	0	0
Chigiin + Warasgeen)	0	0
Tagab (sorkh joi)	0	0
Sagsokhtai (sorkh joi)	0	0
Qumi Barfi	1	1
Qumi Khodi	0	0
Qumi Mirza	0	0
ShioniOba+Acha sariasp	0	0
Abdal + Gunbatak	0	0
Qumi Yari	0	0
Kunduk + Warzang	0	0
Safitghaw-e-sufla	0	0
Binigaw + petab joi	0	0
Safitghaw ulya	0	0
Buzgirak	0	0
Sultanrubat + bastook	0	0
Fato	0	0
Petab joi	0	0
Shahi	0	0
Qunuq	0	0
Totals	3	1

Appendix P: Health, health facilities and vaccination: district level

Bamiyan

Imam Hussain Hospital: 30 beds, supported by Iranians
Fixed EPI centre opened May 1998
Ibn Sina clinic: MCH, OPD consultations, EPI, malnutrition screening, health education
Fulady clinic 14 km from centre, supported by ICRC: OPD, vaccination, health education
Area/MoPH clinic: OPD, vaccination.
Sar Asyab clinic started June 1998, supported by Habitat and PSF: OPD and health education.

All villagers had access to a latrine but might be sharing with another family.
Water collected from streams.
Vaccinations widely covered.

Nawor

Has vaccination point within what was formerly a clinic, no other health facilities exist.
Vaccinations covered in most areas, but only polio and vitamin A drops.
Not much traditional medicine.
Deaths estimated at between 15-35% for women during childbirth, with up to 20% from tetanus.
Deaths likely for 30-50% of babies born (50% due to tetanus, 25% due to LBW and 25% due to septicaemia).
About half villages visited had latrines for half households.
Water was collected mainly from river and springs, though some access to wells

Malistan

Has a C1 clinic run by the Swedish committee. There is a doctor and fully trained midwife, health education and vaccinations.
Vaccinations covered in only two out of nine villages visited and then only polio.
Traditional medicine not much practised.
One TBA in area who charges. Around 30% of babies die, up to half of them from of tetanus.
Not many villages had latrines and water is collected from rivers

Jaghori

Has 1 hospital and 8 clinics supported by Shuhada - the hospital was described as good though lacking resources, mainly due to the blockade. It is unclear whether this situation has now improved.
Vaccinations covered in about half villages visited.
Not much use of TBAs. Those who could afford to used trained midwife at Sang-e-Masha.
10% of babies died.
Traditional medicine not much practised.
Latrines for over half the population.
Water collected from rivers

Waras:

Health situation said to be very poor.
ACF is repairing the old government hospital.
Shuhada moved to Waras, but just for dia training and then will move on to other districts.

Lepco is in Takht with a good doctor and good medicine.
Private doctors do family planning and one can find medicine in bazaar.
Two pharmacies in district centre, three in Shar-I-Nau including a qualified doctor, two in Takht, one in Band-I-Khosar.

Lal
Lepco, IAM, Shuhada. Clinics don't do outreach and no co-ordination between them.
Four pharmacies (private) in Lal; four in Garmab; one in Qizil. Good quality medicine, better than in Yakawlang.
Four vaccinators, one very good; used to be hospital with clinic service.
39% of the valleys have at least one trained dia.

Dai Kundi:
No clinic. No dias.
Pharmacies: one in Khader, but in the shops you can find medicine. (Shekmiran people are saying that if someone provides a pharmacy they will help them.) Interviewed in late November, one informant from Shekmiran described the situation thus:

> *"This year, just 12 days ago, vaccines were sent to Shekmiran and Khader from UNICEF. Some vaccinators were trained for a day by a person in Panjao. In Khader they didn't get a vaccinator, they just sent vaccines and one person who has pharmacy in Khader brought the vaccines. It is the first time any vaccines have been here. There were no cards but a list came from Panjao via Ashtarlai. The health situation is very bad, there is a lot of sickness: 'everyone sick in Shekmiran'. Mostly people use river water but there are wells, more than in Panjao. In summer if someone is sick you can at least get to Panjao, in winter there is nothing. The lack of a midwife is a very big problem, a lot of women are dying, lot of children dying before 5"*

Panjao
ACF clinic in Panjao (previously MSF from Autumn 1996), ACF wants to open sub-clinics in Kharqul and Targai.
Before the Taliban came there was an Iranian health clinic.
43% of the valleys had a trained dia. (Training of dias started as far back as 1978 when a group of older women went to Bamiyan to be trained as dias then returned to villages - it was a stimulus for mullahs to say they were communist.)

Yakawlang
Shuhada hospital in Nayak has one male and one female doctor and three male and three female nurses.
Three pharmacies in Nayak, nothing in rest of district.
12.5% of the valleys were reported to have at least one dia.
Vaccinators have been trained by Avicen in Sadat region, Sar-e-Qul village (two); Takana, Dahani Kanlak (one); Sia Dara, Pastalak (one); and Qumi Aba, Sachak (one).

Behsud:

Appendix Q: Baseline survey – Education facilities

District: Lal

Valley	Primary		Secondary		High		Totals	
School level	now	before war	now	before war	now	before war	now	before war
Jawqul	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Safid chashma	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Qulani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gerou Lal Payan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Petab Lal Payan	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	3
Saqaba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shakraki	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Petab Lal Miana	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
Nawi Aghan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dewalak	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Kirman	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Talkhak	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
Sarjangal Payan	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	4
Sarjangal Miana	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	3
Sarjangal Bala	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	3
Totals	1	12	0	8	0	1	1	21

District: Panjao

Valley	Primary		Secondary		High		Totals	
School level	now	before war	now	before war	now	before war	now	before war
Tagabbarg	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Nurgis	3	3	0	0	1	2	4	5
Morka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Akhzarat	2	1	1	1	0	0	3	2
Gandab	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Goder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sagdis	0	0	3	1	0	0	3	1
Miankawak	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Targhai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tarapas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mohr	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Ghur Ghury	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Turbulaq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kerman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Naiqul	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Darazqul	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	7	6	4	2	2	2	13	10

District: Waras

Valley / School level	Primary now	Primary before war	Secondary now	Secondary before war	High now	High before war	Totals now	Totals before war
Dola, Tagabsha	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Gero-e-Sarab	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Sari Sarab+Petab Parab	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Qumi Sultan (surk joui)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Soukh Kawak + Tagabghar	2	2	0	0	0	0	2	2
Ligan + Pazahndor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plan Naspato	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Sari Tkhat	2	1	1	1	1	0	4	2
Qulbatoo(Takht)	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	1
Chigin (Waras)	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3
Sial borda (sorkh joi)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Galqul (sorkh joi)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chigiin + Warasgeen)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tagab (sorkh joi)	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	2
Sagsokhtai (sorkh joi)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Qumi Barfi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Qumi Khodi	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	2
Qumi Mirza	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
ShioniOba+Acha sariasp	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Abdal + Gunbatak	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Qumi Yari	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Kunduk + Warzang	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safitghaw-e-sufla	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Binigaw + petab joi	3	1	1	1	1	0	5	2
Safitghaw ulya	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Buzgirak	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sultanrubat + bastook	1	1	1	1	0	0	2	2
Fato	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
Petab joi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shahi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Qunuq	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0
Totals	21	11	5	6	3	1	29	18

Appendix R: Education: district reports

ACF's work in *Malistan, Nawor and Jaghori* showed that most villages had Koranic schools run in the mimbar, usually for girls and boys and usually running in the winter. Teachers were in general supported by the community. Other schools operated in major bazaar towns in each district, although in more isolated areas schools that had operated in the past had closed down due to the war and lack of resources. Schools were generally shared between villages and available to boys and girls. Jaghori had a school for boys and girls at Sang-e-Masha and Hediat. Malistan had a school at Miradina, Shineday and Abo Ali Sina. Nawor had two schools for boys and girls.

Sharistan had only three recorded formal schools, all for boys, and only five non-formal schools supported by any agency. It did, however, have a large number of community-supported non-formal schools - 56 in total with 1,346 boy pupils and 118 girls.

Lal had 23 formal schools in 1978, 16 in 1998 and none functioning in 1999 - due to poor security. Non-formal schools were, however, still operating, with 26 winter schools supported by agencies and 21 by the community themselves.

Waras has historically low levels of provision. Even before war there were only two junior high schools and eight primary schools. Levels of education were lowest of all districts except Dai Kundi. All the formal schools were closed in 1998, but currently there are eight primary schools for boys and five for girls and two secondary schools for boys. It is reported that Akbari encouraged girls' schools and gave the salary for woman teaching at the school in Petab Jui. Support for non-formal education in Waras is also strong with 35 agency-supported winter schools and 23 community-supported ones.

Dai Kundi has no formal school. There used to be secondary schools in Khader, Shekmiran, Ashtarlai and a couple of primary schools in each area but after the revolution everything stopped except one junior high school in Nili. Many school buildings became military posts. Two years ago the authorities managed to re-start schools and all girls went, but now schools have stopped again. Girls' schools received support from the Panjao side and Takht. But though the district has very few literate adults and almost no literate women there is still a great commitment to education and villages try to organise their own schools (for girls as well as boys) and to pay something to teachers. Oxfam began a winter schools programme in 1999-2000 with support to schools for girls and boys in ten villages.

> *"Everybody is interested to go to school but they are poor, how to provide pen and paper?"*

Yakawlang: Before the war there were said to be 18 schools with a total of 3,543 students, in 1999 there were 24 and 7,847 students, 2,296 of whom were girls. There are also winter schools.

Panjao has 11 formal primary schools for boys and one for girls, it also has a very large number of non-formal winter schools, 35 supported by agencies and a further 103 run by the community. In total they cater for 2,985 boys and 935 girls.

Behsud: According to the Madera 1996 survey there were no more than 41 schools in the whole area, of which only 27 were in good condition.

But others spoke of relations between Tajik and Hazara being good, 'except when there is fighting between Massoud and Wahdat'.

Before their arrival in the area there was real fear of the Taliban, especially as stories of killings in Mazar reached Hazarajat, but feelings towards Pashtuns in general varied. Some spoke with anger about how they had taken Hazara lands; others remembered things rather more gently:

> *"Pashtuns ruled the country for 100, maybe 200 years and Hazarajat was a stable place. The Pashtuns had good relationships with the people — there was no problem between ethnic groups."*

There was a general belief that outside parties were responsible for many of the problems:

> *"If outside parties stop interfering then the gaps between ethnic groups will disappear."*

And there were also stories of positive interventions:

> *"There was a Pashtun living in Bamiyan and he saved many Hazaras. The Tajiks they did a very bad thing — they burned houses and killed women and children."*

But the issue isn't simply one of divisions between major 'ethnic' groups, but also of division within. Beneath the broad designation Hazara, there are complex divisions and the extent to which members of these groups see themselves as separate has varied over time and is linked to the political movements in the area. Group membership derives from both traditional leadership patterns related to land and family and to religion, and these can overlap. Most ambiguous is the position of Sayyeds. The traditional religious leadership of the Hazaras and estimated to form between 4% and 5% of the population of Hazarajat, Sayyeds trace their lineage back to the prophet and originally were Arab. Although marriage of Hazara men to Sayyed women is rare, marriage of Sayyed men to Hazara women is common. Hence there are many Sayyeds with Hazara features, sometimes known as Hazara Sayyeds. Sometimes they describe themselves as Hazara, and are described so by others; at other times they describe themselves as a separate group.

This sense of separateness would appear to be on the increase. Prior to the revolution it seems that Hazara Sayyeds identified as Hazara and there was much less of a sense of Sayyeds as separate, but over the last 20 years this has changed. All those interviewed spoke of the problem as not being one created at community level, but as something brought about by politics and parties, with Shia parties seen as trying to isolate Hazara and Sayyed and trying to make conflict between them. In the words of one informant:

> "Before the revolution nationality wasn't an identity card, only after the Russian did Sayyed start to separate out as a group, not before; they started to talk of themselves as a different race and to form a political party, the Difa az Harim Sadat."

This formation of a party was viewed by those interviewed as a negative development; but although the politicisation of Sayyeds was seen as recent, it was acknowledged that it tapped into an older social differentiation. Sayyeds were said by non-Sayyed Hazaras to see themselves as 'higher' people and to expect tribute:

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Chris Johnson, March 2000

For the UN Co-ordinator's Office

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